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Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

I. Introduction

1. In its letter dated 20 December 2010 (S/2910/661), the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2013, and requested me to report on the implementation of the revised mandate of UNOWA every six months. The present report covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2011.

2. The present report provides an overview of national, cross-cutting and cross-border developments in West Africa and outlines the activities undertaken by UNOWA in preventive diplomacy and awareness-raising with regard to emerging threats and challenges to regional peace and stability. It also presents the efforts of the Office to promote synergies at the subregional level in cooperation with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mano River Union.

II. Developments and trends in West Africa

A. Political trends

3. Since my previous report, developments in West Africa have presented both challenges and opportunities. In this regard, while election-related tensions and risks continued to be a source of concern in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia and Senegal, there were no major setbacks or crises in the region during the period under review. The Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa, which was endorsed during the regional conference organized by UNOWA in Praia, Cape Verde, from 18 to 20 May 2011, provided a new opportunity for subregional countries to reaffirm their commitment to the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Furthermore, civil society organizations in West Africa played an active role in disseminating the recommendations from the Praia Declaration, thereby strengthening advocacy efforts for the respect of political rights and the holding of credible, transparent and peaceful elections.

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4. At the same time, the period under review witnessed an increase in cross-border and structural threats to the subregion's stability. The conflict in Libya and the post-presidential election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire continued to have a negative impact on the socio-economic, humanitarian and security situation of countries in the Sahel region and Mano River Union subregions, respectively. The rise in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, and the negative effects of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in several countries, also contributed to increased insecurity in West Africa.

B. Economic, social and humanitarian trends

5. The economies of many countries in West Africa remained resilient in spite of the global financial crisis, owing in part to macroeconomic reform efforts. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), West Africa will register an overall economic growth rate of approximately 5 per cent in 2011. However, this overall rate could begin to decline as a result of increasing food insecurity and the prolongation of the international financial crisis.

6. The economic outlook for the region also continues to be closely linked to environmental conditions. As a result of delayed and below average rainfall during this year's rainy season, the 2011-2012 harvest is anticipated to be lower than last year, particularly in the Sahel countries. However, the 2011-2012 harvest will still be within the overall average of the last five years.

7. The deteriorating regional humanitarian situation resulting from the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya had a serious impact on food security. In the Sahel, the massive influx of returning migrant workers, especially in Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Mali and Niger, deprived thousands of families of remittances while at the same time placing an economic burden on returnee communities. Reduced incomes, the higher price of basic food supplies and the projected decrease in food and pasture production during the 2011-2012 planting season have further exacerbated food insecurity in these countries. In this connection, during a summit of Heads of State held on 24 November in Niamey, the Presidents of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger called on the international community to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to combat food insecurity in these countries.

8. In the Mano River Union subregion, Ivorian refugees in neighbouring countries and internally displaced persons in Côte d'Ivoire also experienced food insecurity. In eastern Liberia, which hosts more than 85 per cent of Ivorian refugees, local communities are also feeling the impact of food insecurity. Despite this situation, the Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Liberia — which appeals for resources to assist a projected 150,000 refugees, as well as 25,000 returnees and third-country nationals — remains underfunded. The Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Côte d'Ivoire and its four neighbours (Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Togo) is also underfunded.

C. Security trends, including drug trafficking and organized crime

9. Weak rule of law systems combined with high levels of poverty in a number of West African countries continued to undermine regional efforts to combat organized crime and drug trafficking. Criminal organizations continue to use West Africa as a

transit point for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin, and for the production of synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine. On 11 October, authorities in Cape Verde announced the seizure of a consignment of over 1.5 tons of cocaine.

10. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has escalated both in frequency and intensity. The increase in pirate attacks in the region has led to higher maritime insurance costs and has caused a significant decline in customs and port revenues received by coastal countries. This trend has become especially acute off the coast of Benin, which lacks the capacity and the resources to adequately respond to this mounting threat. ECOWAS has been working closely with member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to develop regional initiatives to combat the increasing incidents of piracy.

11. Insecurity in the Sahel region continued to increase in the period under review owing to the return of armed elements from Libya to their home countries, especially Mali and Niger. There are concerns that these elements could stir up pre-existing political and security tensions in the receiving countries.

12. Participants of the conference on development and security in the Sahel, convened by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in Algiers on 7 and 8 September, and of the meeting of the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff, held in Abuja on 4 and 5 October), expressed concern over the proliferation of a range of weapons, originating from Libya — from small arms to surface-to-air missiles — into its neighbouring countries. There are reports that some of these weapons may be falling into the hands of criminal and terrorist groups operating in the area. This matter was also discussed during the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, which took place on 21 November in Mali.

13. The porous nature of the borders in the Sahel region and the inaccessibility of the terrain combined with the limited national border security capacity make it difficult for countries in the region to tackle these security challenges alone. It is in this context that the Government of Niger has appealed for international assistance, particularly in the area of aerial surveillance, to secure its vast border with Libya.

14. The presence of armed combatants and mercenary groups along the border between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia continued to be a serious source of instability during the reporting period. Recurrent attacks on local populations in the border areas by these groups are fuelling a climate of fear and insecurity among the local populations. There are also concerns about arms caches in remote locations on both sides of the border that could be used by these groups to fuel instability in either country.

15. Terrorist groups continued to pose a significant threat to a number of countries in the region. During the reporting period, a series of attacks carried out by the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria claimed the lives of large numbers of civilians, including United Nations personnel, and resulted in injury to many others. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb was also active during the reporting period with a series of kidnappings of foreign nationals in the region. There is also growing concern in the region about possible linkages between Boko Haram and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

D. Trends on human rights and gender issues

16. During the reporting period, some countries in the subregion took further steps to ratify the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which is a positive indication of the growing respect for democracy, good governance and human rights. Both Niger and Guinea deposited their instruments of ratification, thus bringing the number of West African countries that have ratified this instrument to five. Encouraging developments in the area of impunity have also been noted with the conviction in August of three police officers in Burkina Faso responsible for the death of a student while in custody, and the launching of political dialogue and national reconciliation processes in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Togo. However, these steps aimed at addressing impunity need to be strengthened in order to consolidate democratic gains and sustainable peace. In addition, violence against women continued in a number of countries in the subregion.

III. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

A. United Nations good offices and special assignments for conflict and crisis prevention

Guinea

17. During the period under review, the political situation in Guinea remained tense as a result of an assassination attempt against President Alpha Condé, a lack of a consensus on modalities for the organization of the legislative elections and limited progress in the implementation of the national reconciliation framework. My Special Representative remained engaged with the main political stakeholders, with a view to supporting national reconciliation efforts and promoting political inclusiveness, in close collaboration with the United Nations country team in Guinea, as well as with the African Union Special Envoy for Guinea, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, the Guinea configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Group of Friends of Guinea.

18. On 19 July, a group of heavily armed assailants attacked the private residence of the President. The attack, which resulted in the arrest of several members of the Guinean armed forces, further exacerbated political tensions in the country. The attack was strongly condemned by national stakeholders, regional actors and the wider international community. My Special Representative travelled to Conakry after the attack to reiterate the United Nations condemnation of the attack, while calling again on all Guineans to refrain from any acts that could undermine the ongoing consolidation of democratic institutions.

19. Also in July, President Condé instructed the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization to engage all political parties with a view to seeking consensus on the preparations for the legislative elections. The issues dividing the political class included the revisions to the voters' list, the conduct of a new census, the reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and representation by the political parties in the decentralized structures of CENI.

20. On 15 August, President Condé nominated the Grand Imam and the Archbishop of Conakry as co-Presidents of the Provisional Commission for National

Reconciliation. Since then, the co-Presidents have initiated countrywide consultations with a view to obtaining a preliminary consensus on the framework for national reconciliation in Guinea. On 15 December, my Special Representative participated in a session of the Provisional Commission in Conakry.

21. The announcement made by the President of CENI on 15 September that legislative elections will be held on 29 December further exacerbated tensions as the main opposition coalition, the coalition of political parties for the finalization of the transition, rejected the announced date and called on its members to participate in a demonstration on 27 September. This demonstration resulted in three deaths, several injuries and a number of arrests.

22. On 23 September, President Condé attended the meeting of the Guinea configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission in New York, during which the configuration adopted a statement of mutual commitment, which is a joint strategy to promote national reconciliation, reform the security sector, and promote efforts to create job opportunities for women and young people in Guinea. In my meeting with President Condé on the same day, I encouraged him to spare no efforts in resolving differences between the country's political actors with a view to ensuring the conduct of peaceful and credible legislative elections.

23. At the request of President Condé, on 26 September, the Prime Minister of Guinea, Mohamed Said Fofana, proposed the establishment of a framework for consultations for political parties to reach consensus on preparations for the legislative elections. On 29 September, the main opposition parties conditioned their participation in the consultations on the release of those arrested in connection with the demonstrations of 27 September and the suspension of all activities of CENI until consensus was reached on the modalities for the holding of the legislative elections.

24. In October and November, the facilitation team of the consultation framework, which is led by a representative of the National Transition Council, held a series of informal consultations. In support of this initiative, my Special Representative, together with the African Union Special Envoy for Guinea and in close cooperation with ECOWAS and international partners, encouraged the Government and the opposition parties to continue to engage in dialogue with a view to arriving at a consensus on the preparation for the elections.

25. On 15 November, President Condé convened a meeting with the leaders of the main opposition parties and the ruling party to discuss preparations for the elections. On 17 November and 6 December, the President granted amnesty to a total of 40 individuals who had been arrested and arraigned in connection with the 27 September demonstration. Notwithstanding these measures, the two main opposition coalitions on 29 November concluded that there was a lack of political will from the Government to facilitate dialogue with a view to organizing credible legislative polls.

Electoral processes in the subregion

Senegal

26. The Security Council will recall that, following the violent incidents that took place in that country last June, my Special Representative met with President Abdoulaye Wade to encourage him to do his utmost to create conditions conducive

to the holding of peaceful and transparent elections scheduled for 26 February 2012. He also expressed the wish for all stakeholders to avoid any action that could undermine democracy and the country's long-standing stability. Since that period, no violence has been reported and the situation remains calm. However, the June 23 Movement, which is comprised of several opposition political parties and some civil society organizations, continues to challenge the validity of the candidacy of President Wade who intends to run for the next elections. On 1 December, the opposition coalition Benno Siggil Senegal failed to reach consensus on a single candidate to represent the opposition in the elections.

Mali

27. On 11 October, my Special Representative met with President Amadou Toumani Touré to advocate for the conduct of transparent and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2012, which would culminate in the smooth handover of power as Mali's democracy progresses. On 30 November, political parties and civil society groups joined in a demonstration to protest against a referendum expected to take place in April 2012, which proposes changes to the Constitution, including the creation of a Senate.

The Gambia

28. Presidential elections were conducted in the Gambia on 24 November. In the lead up to the elections, ECOWAS issued a statement indicating that it would not deploy an electoral observer mission on the basis that it had assessed the preparations and political environment not to be conducive for the conduct of transparent polls. On 25 November, the Independent Electoral Commission announced that incumbent President Yahya Jammeh had won his fourth consecutive term with 72 per cent of the votes. In a joint statement issued on 28 November, the opposition parties refuted the results. While agreeing that there were no major irregularities on election day, the observer team from the Commonwealth referred to the need for democratic reforms to strengthen governance in the country and the creation of a level playing field in the lead up to the elections in the country. The African Union Observer Mission was critical of the pre-election environment, in particular of the lack of equal access to public media. However, it found that there were no acts of intimidation on election day and concluded that, despite the shortcomings, the results were a true reflection of the will of the sovereign people of the Gambia. For its part, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation expressed satisfaction that the voting process was generally held under free, fair and transparent conditions.

The Sahel region

29. As referred to earlier in the present report, the recent conflict in Libya had a profound impact on neighbouring countries, especially in the Sahel region. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as at 27 November, some 200,000 migrants had crossed Libya's borders into neighbouring West African countries. In addition, IOM reports that there were approximately 100,000 returnees to Niger and 12,000 returnees to Mali, respectively, since the start of the Libyan conflict. In order to assess the political, humanitarian and socio-economic implications of this large-scale migration from Libya, my Special Representative visited Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger

in October, where he consulted with the Heads of State, senior Government officials, United Nations country teams and other international partners. All interlocutors stressed that the Libyan crisis had brought new security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges. The Governments in countries with the largest numbers of returnees also indicated that they lack the capacity to address the increased security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges associated with these returns.

30. In his discussions, my Special Representative expressed the willingness of the United Nations to develop a common approach for the Sahel region, building on the activities of the various United Nations country teams and taking into account the increased challenges confronting the subregion. It is against that background that I decided to dispatch an assessment mission to the region, led by the Department of Political Affairs and under the supervision of my Special Representative, with the participation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, IOM, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the Peacebuilding Support Office and UNOWA to develop recommendations for a United Nations system-wide strategy to respond to the needs of the subregion. Representatives of the African Union also agreed to participate in the mission, which visited Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria from 7 to 23 December. The main findings and recommendations of the assessment mission will be conveyed to the Council following completion of the Mission's work.

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

31. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, chaired by my Special Representative, continued to make progress towards the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002.

32. During the twenty-eighth session of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, held on 22 July in Abuja, Cameroon and Nigeria reiterated their determination to complete the cartographic demarcation of the boundary by the end of 2012, with the placement of boundary identification pillars to be pursued beyond 2012. Moreover, during a workshop organized by UNOWA from 8 to 31 August on the extraction of the watershed line in inaccessible areas using the digital elevation model, the parties agreed upon 99.4 km of boundary line, which covers the full distance of the section of the boundary referred to as the Alantika Mountains. The Office also supported the independent experts' team, mandated by the Mixed Commission to make a final determination of the boundary area of Mount Tosso, which the parties pledged to accept. Mount Tosso, which is only accessible by air, covers a distance of approximately 40 km of mountainous terrain. To date, of the estimated 1,950 km of boundary line, more than 1,700 km have been formally agreed upon by the parties.

33. Regarding confidence-building measures, four socio-economic development projects have been identified on the Cameroonian side of the border by a joint United Nations-Government team, which will be further developed in close cooperation with the United Nations country team and the donor community. A joint United Nations-Government mission, aimed at identifying similar socio-economic

development projects on the Nigerian side, was conducted in Cross River, Akwa Ibom and Adawama States of Nigeria from 4 to 16 December.

34. The thirteenth mission to observe the withdrawal and the transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula, within the context of the implementation of the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006, was conducted from 2 to 5 November. The mission noted considerable improvement in the general situation in the area, mainly owing to improved relations between the authorities and the population. The population nevertheless raised concerns regarding the increased security risk caused by piracy and banditry, which will require enhanced cross-border cooperation between the security forces of both countries. Furthermore, access to potable water and health care, particularly for women, is still lacking. Finally the mission underscored the need for citizenship documents to be issued to Bakassi residents.

35. The Follow-up Committee, tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Greentree Agreement, held its seventeenth meeting on 23 November in New York, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. Cameroon and Nigeria reiterated their willingness to continue to consolidate peaceful cooperation and to work on improving socio-economic standards.

36. On 22 November, accompanied by my Special Representative, I met with the heads of delegation of Cameroon and Nigeria to the Mixed Commission and the Follow-up Committee on the Greentree Agreement. The Parties reaffirmed their willingness to resolve outstanding issues pertaining to the ruling of the International Court of Justice by the end of 2012 and to work on strengthening cooperative relations between the two countries. A campaign to raise funds required for the implementation of confidence-building measures between the two parties will be jointly undertaken by the United Nations country teams in both countries.

B. Enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, including piracy

Elections and stability

37. As a follow-up to the Regional Conference on Elections and Stability in West Africa, which took place in Praia, Cape Verde from 18 to 20 May 2011, UNOWA and the International Peace Institute organized a round table in New York on 26 September. The meeting, which was attended by representatives of the ECOWAS Commission, delegates from several United Nations Member States and election practitioners, discussed ways to improve the conduct of electoral processes and the provision of international electoral assistance in order to prevent election-related violence in West Africa.

38. During the reporting period, the West African Human Rights Defenders Network organized, with the support of UNOWA, a panel discussion on the role of civil society organizations in elections, on the margins of the fiftieth session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, held in Banjul on 25 October. The panel discussion resulted in the adoption of a road map for the implementation of the Praia Declaration by civil society organizations of the subregion. In collaboration with its partner organizations in the subregion, the Network is currently formulating an action plan to ensure a coherent approach among West African civil society organizations for the prevention of election-related instability.

Security sector reform

39. Pending the adoption by ECOWAS of a draft regional political framework and plan of action on security sector governance, UNOWA focused on supporting security sector reform efforts in Guinea. In response to President Condé's request for United Nations support in coordinating security sector reform activities in the country, I have decided to deploy a Senior Security Sector Reform Adviser to Guinea to work closely with the United Nations country team to support the security sector reform activities of the Government. The Adviser and his support team will operate under the authority of my Special Representative and in close coordination with the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Guinea.

40. Since the launch of the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee by President Condé on 20 June 2011, several mechanisms have been established to advance implementation of the national security sector reform policy. A strategic committee chaired by the Prime Minister of Guinea met several times between July and November to review the national and sectoral action plans, the census project for the armed forces and the retirement plan for some 4,300 military staff. In this regard, the biometric military census began on 5 October and was concluded on 28 November.

Drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime

41. UNOWA continued to advocate for national and international political support for the fight against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in the subregion. In collaboration with the broader United Nations system, UNOWA and UNODC facilitated discussions on the renewal of the 2008/2011 ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, which ends in December. The plan focuses on measures to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa.

42. During the reporting period, my Special Representative initiated and consolidated partnerships with a number of institutions in support of the fight against transnational organized crime in West Africa. Pursuant to recommendations endorsed by the Group of Eight ministerial conference on transatlantic cocaine routes, held in Paris on 10 May, UNOWA and UNODC advocated for strengthened political and operational commitment from the international community during the visit of the Dublin Group to Dakar in September.

43. UNOWA, UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Criminal Police Organization continued to work together for the implementation of the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) Programme. The first WACI Policy Committee meeting, which was chaired by my Special Representative in Dakar on 20 June, decided to include Guinea in the WACI Programme and to reinforce technical assistance in the four pilot countries, with a view to operationalizing the Transnational Organized Crime Units. While the Transnational Organized Crime Unit of Sierra Leone has successfully engaged in international investigations, the other Transnational Organized Crime Units have yet to demonstrate significant progress towards becoming fully operational.

44. The first meeting of the WACI Programme Advisory Committee, held on 27 October in Bissau, was chaired by UNODC and inaugurated by the Executive Director of UNODC, Yuri Fedotov, and my Special Representative. Delegations

from Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea participated for the first time and expressed their intention to become more actively engaged in the programme. The Programme Advisory Committee provided the opportunity for national delegations from Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone to exchange experiences on the establishment of the Transnational Organized Crime Units, cooperation with judicial systems and enhancing counter-narcotics legislation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Programme Advisory Committee reiterated its support for the establishment of a WACI Project Operational Committee in each pilot country.

Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

45. In response to a request by President Boni Yayi of Benin on 27 July for assistance from the international community in combating the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, my Special Representative travelled to Benin to engage the national authorities on this matter. I subsequently requested the deployment of an assessment mission to Benin and the Gulf of Guinea from 7 to 24 November to (a) assist the Government of Benin in the formulation of a national integrated programme to address the issues of drug trafficking and organized crime; (b) assess the scope of the threat of piracy in Benin; (c) determine the scope of the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region; and (d) explore possible options for an effective United Nations response.

46. The mission, which was co-led by the Department of Political Affairs and UNODC, also comprised representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UNDP, the United Nations Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) and UNOWA. The mission visited Benin from 7 to 17 November, Nigeria from 18 to 19 November, Gabon from 20 to 22 November and Angola from 23 to 24 November, where it met with a broad cross-section of stakeholders, including President Boni Yayi, Government officials, members of the diplomatic community and United Nations country team representatives. The mission also met with ECOWAS in Nigeria, ECCAS in Gabon and the Gulf of Guinea Commission in Angola. As requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2018 (2011), I intend to convey the findings and recommendations of the mission to the Council upon finalization of the mission's report.

C. Promotion of good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and gender mainstreaming

47. During the reporting period, the Office continued to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights and gender mainstreaming by undertaking several initiatives. Within the framework of the regional action plan on the implementation of resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), UNOWA and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) organized regional training sessions on mediation from 19 to 23 July in Nigeria and from 3 to 7 October in Senegal, for 32 women leaders from the 15 ECOWAS member States and Mauritania. The women who took part in that training programme will form part of a pool from which expertise could be drawn for ongoing or future mediation initiatives in the West African region.

48. From 2 to 4 December, UNOWA, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ECOWAS, the African Union, the Mano River Union and the International Organization of La Francophonie, organized a regional conference on impunity, justice and human rights in West Africa, in Bamako. The conference was attended by Ministers of Justice, High Court Presidents and representatives of national reconciliation commissions, ECOWAS member States, Mauritania, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the African Union, the Mano River Union, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and key civil society organizations. Participants adopted the Bamako Declaration and a strategic framework for strengthening the fight against impunity and the consolidation of peace, stability and development in West Africa. The Declaration contains a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening justice mechanisms and mechanisms for the promotion, defence and protection of human rights. It includes measures to fight organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and piracy. It also calls for the significant strengthening of regional and international cooperation in implementing these recommendations.

D. Inter-institutional cooperation

United Nations inter-institutional cooperation

49. In the light of the growing cross-border and cross-cutting challenges to peace and security in West Africa, UNOWA undertook a number of joint initiatives with United Nations peace missions, United Nations country teams in the subregion, OHCHR and the Peacebuilding Commission. Those initiatives included activities related to security, human rights and gender and socio-economic and humanitarian affairs.

50. At my request, UNOWA initiated activities to coordinate the actions of the United Nations presences in the subregion to support the development of a subregional strategy to address the threats of mercenaries, cross-border movements of weapons and armed groups and illicit trafficking, as well as their impact on forced population movement. In that context, my Special Representative dispatched a UNOWA team to Abidjan on 19 September to hold preliminary discussions with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) on ongoing joint UNOCI/United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) inter-mission cooperation measures and the development of a subregional security strategy. Subsequently, UNOWA submitted a set of proposals on the subregional strategy to the leadership of UNOCI, UNMIL, UNIPSIL and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau for their consideration and feedback.

51. On 14 October, my Special Representative convened the ninth meeting of the Dakar-based heads of regional United Nations agencies. Participants agreed to work together to develop a subregional strategy to address the threat of mercenaries, cross-border movements of weapons and armed groups and illicit trafficking, as well as their impact on forced population movements. Regarding the Sahel region, participants undertook to work together to harmonize their respective initiatives in a strategic and coordinated fashion in order to enhance United Nations efforts in the region. They also decided to establish a working group on the Sahel, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative, and composed also of representatives of

the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Food Programme (WFP).

52. The participation of my Special Representative in the meetings of the coordinators of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS in West and Central Africa, of the UNICEF representatives in West and Central Africa and of the WFP country directors for West and Central Africa, held in Dakar on 4 October, 28 October and 6 December, respectively, provided another opportunity to strengthen United Nations inter-institutional cooperation on cross-cutting and cross-border challenges in the subregion.

53. On 28 November, my Special Representative convened the twenty-second high-level meeting of heads of United Nations peace missions in West Africa, in Dakar. My Special Representatives for Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia attended the meeting, which reviewed the situation in the subregion with a special focus on the recently concluded elections in Liberia and the upcoming legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. My Special Representatives also undertook to increase their collaboration, especially in the development of a subregional security strategy to combat cross-border threats in the Mano River Union and with respect to ongoing United Nations regional activities, such as the WACI Programme.

54. My Special Representatives for West and Central Africa held their first consultation in Dakar in an effort to strengthen collaboration on issues related to peace and security in the two African subregions. They exchanged views on common cross-border threats in the two subregions, including insecurity in the Sahel Band — notably in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis — and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. They also underlined the importance of promoting a regional approach in conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the capacity-building of subregional organizations. In his capacity as Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Said Djinnit briefed his colleagues on progress in the implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling related to the peaceful delimitation of the border between the two countries. The Special Representatives agreed to meet on a regular basis and to facilitate a continuous exchange of information between UNOWA and UNOCA.

Cooperation with regional and subregional partners

55. In addition to joint activities mentioned earlier in the present report, UNOWA and ECOWAS undertook a number of joint initiatives with a view to further strengthening regional capacities, including in the field of conflict management and conflict prevention.

56. During the meeting of West African Chiefs of Security Institutions, which took place on 27 and 28 July in Abuja, the ECOWAS Commission announced that it had initiated a process towards the development of a subregional framework to effectively address terrorism. UNOWA participated in a governmental experts' meeting organized by ECOWAS in Bamako from 11 to 13 October to review the subregional counter-terrorism strategy. A second experts' meeting is expected to be held before the strategy is presented at the ECOWAS ministerial level for endorsement.

57. In response to the call of the ECOWAS mini-summit held in Abuja on 10 September, which was attended by the Heads of State and Government of

Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal, my Special Representative undertook a mission to Liberia from 13 to 15 September, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho. The joint ECOWAS/United Nations delegation met with national authorities, including President Sirleaf-Johnson, to discuss steps to overcome security challenges in the border areas between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire ahead of the 11 October Liberian presidential and parliamentary elections.

58. From 26 to 28 September, UNOWA, together with representatives of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, participated in a workshop organized by the African Union Border Programme in Addis Ababa. The event focused on enhancing cooperation between regional partners to prevent conflict through good management of boundaries, knowledge sharing and lessons learned and best practices from demarcation processes in Africa.

59. On 4 and 5 October, UNOWA participated in the twenty-ninth meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in Abuja. The meeting focused on the implementation of the ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. Participants pledged their support for security sector reform processes and the establishment of codes of conduct for military and security forces in their respective countries. In addition, they decided to establish a special committee to review the draft maritime security strategy for the Gulf of Guinea prior to the next meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff. The meeting also discussed issues related to the organization and training of the ECOWAS Standby Force.

60. During the period under review, UNOWA and ECOWAS continued efforts to ensure that local actors are integrated into the overall peace and security architecture in West Africa. In collaboration with ECOWAS, UNOWA held a workshop from 17 to 19 October in Senegal, which identified challenges and priorities for peacebuilding in West Africa and discussed the need for mechanisms aimed at addressing these challenges.

61. With a view to strengthening the capacities of ECOWAS, UNOWA organized a workshop in Dakar on 19 and 20 October for the Abuja-based analysts of the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, aimed at improving their skills in political analysis and reporting. A follow-on training workshop on humanitarian contingency planning and gender sensitive indicators will be organized in 2012 jointly with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UN-Women.

62. UNOWA participated in the Mano River Union Joint Security Committee meeting, held in Conakry from 28 to 30 November. During the meeting, the fifteenth Mano River Union Protocol on Peace and Security was updated to include an implementation framework, aimed at facilitating joint training, patrolling, and coordination and exchange of security information among Member States. The revised protocol also broadened the scope of the mandate of the Mano River Union to include additional emerging security threats, such as piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. On 30 November, my Special Representative travelled to Guinea to address the opening session of the Mano River Union ministerial consultative meeting attended by ministers from Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, at which the revised fifteenth Mano River Union Protocol on Peace and Security was endorsed. On that occasion, he pledged United Nations support to ongoing efforts aimed at

revitalizing the Mano River Union, including through the 2011-2013 UNOWA/ Mano River Union Strategic Framework of Cooperation for Peace and Security.

IV. Observations and recommendations

63. Despite the fragile security situation in a number of countries, there was a decline in open conflict in West Africa during the reporting period. In this regard, I am pleased to note that the actions and activities of UNOWA and its partners in the United Nations system contributed positively to this situation. Nonetheless, the subregion still faces an increase in cross-cutting and cross-border challenges which could, if left unaddressed, undermine regional stability and, ultimately, reverse the peace consolidation gains made over the past few years. UNOWA will continue to work closely with its partners, including those in the United Nations system, to support subregional initiatives aimed at countering these threats and challenges.

64. I commend the Government of Guinea for its efforts to stabilize and consolidate peace in that country. The timely holding of free, fair and peaceful legislative elections will further contribute to reinforcing the democratization process in Guinea. It is therefore paramount that the ruling and opposition parties demonstrate flexibility and goodwill to reach consensus on modalities for the holding of the legislative elections and for the building of public confidence in electoral mechanisms and institutions.

65. A successful national reconciliation process will also constitute an important step towards the consolidation of stability in the country. In that respect, I encourage the Government to foster national reconciliation. The United Nations remains fully committed to supporting the Government of Guinea in these endeavours.

66. I am pleased with the progress made by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, which is due in large part to the commitment by the two countries to complete the implementation of the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice and to strengthen bilateral ties. I urge the parties to respect the schedule of meetings that they have set for themselves and to continue to work towards the provision of the timely technical, legal and financial support required in order to make progress in the delineation of the boundary line. I also encourage the parties to establish a new management structure to assist in the coordination and supervision of the demarcation work. I wish to reaffirm the unwavering support of the United Nations for the efforts of the two countries to overcome all outstanding issues and to complete the delineation of the boundary by the end of 2012.

67. The spirit of teamwork demonstrated by national partners and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in identifying confidence-building measures along the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary line is very encouraging. In this regard, I urge the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to continue their engagement with the populations affected by the demarcation process with a view to further enhancing relations.

68. Regional efforts to prevent election-related violence, which has contributed to instability in several countries in the subregion, must continue. In this regard, I am encouraged by the various initiatives taken by West African stakeholders, including civil society organizations, to implement the recommendations of the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa. It will be especially important

that Governments in the region make every effort to reduce political, ethnic and social tensions and vigorously pursue policies of inclusiveness and national reconciliation. UNOWA will continue to support national and regional efforts to achieve those objectives.

69. In the coming months, UNOWA will reinforce its collaborative relationship with ECOWAS, the Mano River Union, regional United Nations country teams and other partners in the promotion and protection of human rights, the fight against impunity and the mainstreaming of human rights and gender into electoral and governance processes. In that regard, I call on Member States to implement the Praia Declaration and the Bamako Declaration and strategic framework.

70. In the months ahead, the fallout from the Libyan crisis is likely to continue to challenge stability in the Sahel region, which will require strengthened cooperation among the Governments of the region. My Special Representative and the rest of the United Nations system will remain active in supporting regional cooperation efforts aimed at addressing the political, security, humanitarian and development needs of the people in the region. Furthermore, in the light of the possible linkages between terrorist groups active in West Africa and the influx of weapons from Libya into neighbouring countries, I encourage the countries of the subregion to swiftly adopt and implement the draft ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan. I also call on Member States and international and regional organizations to generously respond to appeals for support from Sahel countries which need capacity-building and funds with which to counter the destabilization threats.

71. Transnational organized crime, including illicit drug trafficking, remains another major threat to peace and security in West Africa. I therefore encourage the countries of the subregion to continue to pursue measures to combat this scourge through the implementation of ongoing programmes, in particular the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan against organized crime and illicit drug trafficking, and the West Africa Coast Initiative. I call on international partners to provide financial support for these programmes.

72. The rise of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will require a concerted effort by countries and organizations of the region, with logistical, diplomatic, financial and technical support from the international community.

73. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of West African countries, the African Union, ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, as well as other subregional and regional institutions, for working closely with UNOWA. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the various entities within the United Nations system active in West Africa, including the heads of United Nations peace operations, regional offices, country teams and other relevant entities, for their support and cooperation with UNOWA. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Said Djinnit, the staff of UNOWA and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for their tireless efforts to advance peace and security in West Africa.

United Nations S/2011/812

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 28 December 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, which was established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) and extended for the period ending 31 December 2013 by Security Council resolution 1963 (2010).

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you that I intend to extend the appointment of Mr. Mike Smith (Australia) as Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate through 31 December 2012.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2011/813

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 30 December 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 28 December 2011 (S/2011/812) concerning your intention to extend the appointment of Mr. Mike Smith (Australia) as Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate through 31 December 2012 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Vitaly I. **Churkin**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2011/814

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2011

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2003 (2011), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on progress made in implementing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report provides an update on the situation in Darfur, as well as an assessment of progress made against benchmarks set out in annex II to my report of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592) and, pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2003 (2011), an assessment of the conditions necessary for a Darfur-based political process and an update on the development of a road map for the Darfur peace process.

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, the parties signatory to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur took a number of steps towards its implementation. On 22 October, the chair of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), Eltigani Seisi, accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, Ahmad bin Abdullah Al Mahmoud, travelled to the Sudan to consult with the Government and local stakeholders on the implementation of the Doha Document. In a statement issued on the same day, the Government indicated that Mr. Seisi's return to the Sudan marked the beginning of the implementation phase of the Doha Document.

3. On 23 October, Mr. Seisi was sworn in by the President of the Sudan, Omer Hassan Al-Bashir, as Chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, the body created under the Doha Document responsible for overseeing its implementation. From 24 to 29 October, Mr. Seisi and Deputy Prime Minister Al Mahmoud travelled to El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala, Zalingei and Al Daein in Darfur to meet with Government and local stakeholders. Mr. Seisi expressed his commitment to implementing the Doha Document, solicited the cooperation of the State Governors and identified his main priorities as the imperatives of improving security, promoting reconciliation and establishing an enabling environment for voluntary returns.

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4. For the most part, his interlocutors expressed a strong desire for peace and development. They articulated mixed views, however, ranging from optimism to deep scepticism, about the readiness of the parties to implement the Doha Document. They noted concern about the absence of support for the Document on the part of the non-signatory movements and doubt about the willingness of the Government to follow through faithfully on its commitments.

5. Mr. Seisi cancelled a scheduled visit to Kalma camp after two internally displaced persons had been killed and one injured on 26 October in an incident that camp residents attributed to his pending visit. Internally displaced persons opposed to the Doha Document accused LJM of being responsible for the incident. LJM denied any involvement and stated that the incident had been an attempt by those opposed to the Document to derail the peace process. A UNAMID investigation was unable to conclusively ascertain the affiliation or motive of the assailants.

6. Since the issuance of my previous report (S/2011/643), the Ceasefire Commission has met four times in El Fasher under the chairmanship of the UNAMID Force Commander. The parties have submitted information indicating the disposition and locations of their forces and have agreed to verification procedures. Verification has not begun, however, as LJM has not yet nominated its representatives for the ceasefire team site groups, which will undertake verification. The completion of the verification exercise is a prerequisite for the provision of non-military logistical support; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and the integration of LJM combatants into the Sudanese Armed Forces.

7. While the Doha Document did not set out deadlines for the commencement or completion of verification, it called on the parties to submit information indicating the disposition of their forces to the Joint Chief Mediator before signing the Document. While the Government of the Sudan submitted its information on the day it signed the Document, LJM did not do so until 13 October. This, and delays with respect to LJM representatives joining the Ceasefire Commission and nominating representatives for the ceasefire team site groups, delayed the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements. The verification exercise is scheduled to commence in January.

8. The inaugural meeting of the Joint Commission established under the Doha Document was held, under the chairmanship of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, in Khartoum on 18 December. This body is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and arbitrating on issues referred to it by the Ceasefire Commission. Representatives of the signatory parties, the European Union, the Government of Qatar, the League of Arab States and countries with observer status in the Joint Commission (Canada and China) attended the meeting. The Joint Commission received a briefing on the activities of the Ceasefire Commission, adopted rules of procedure and deliberated on several outstanding issues, including the status of LJM fighters located outside the Sudan, LJM political prisoners and the verification of forces. Participants agreed, inter alia, that LJM would submit to the Joint Commission the names of the fighters located outside the Sudan and an inventory of their equipment; that discussions about the status of LJM political prisoners would be taken up by a Government of the Sudan-LJM joint technical committee on prisoners; and that LJM would submit its list of nominees for the

ceasefire team site groups to the Ceasefire Commission without further delay to enable verification to commence.

9. Despite the progress noted above, the inauguration of the Darfur Regional Authority, which was to have taken place within 30 days of the signing of the Doha Document, has not yet occurred. The Government informed UNAMID that the delay was due to the inability of LJM to agree on a structure for the body. LJM attributed the delay to the protracted negotiations between the National Congress Party and opposition parties on the formation of a new national Government, but conceded that consultations within the movement on the structure were still ongoing. UNAMID is providing advice to LJM on the organizational structure of the Darfur Regional Authority, and it is expected that the Authority will be inaugurated late in December.

10. During the reporting period, the relationship between the signatories to the Doha Document was tested on two occasions. On 29 November, a Sudanese Armed Forces patrol investigating reports of suspicious military activity encountered LJM militia members at a makeshift training camp in Kasuli (25 km north-east of Mukjar). LJM claimed that a clash had occurred when the forces had come into contact. The Government and local elements interviewed by UNAMID stated the LJM fighters had departed the area without engaging the SAF patrol. UNAMID could find no evidence that an exchange of fire had taken place.

11. In a second incident, on 10 December, a riot broke out in Shalla prison in El Fasher after prison authorities had attempted to execute 10 LJM prisoners sentenced to death following their capture by the Sudanese Armed Forces and their subsequent conviction, six months prior to the signing of the Doha Document, for crimes against the State. The 10 LJM prisoners, assisted by other prisoners, resisted the prison authorities, resulting in a violent struggle during which one prisoner (not an LJM member) was shot dead and nine others were injured. UNAMID intervened with senior Government officials to prevent the executions. Under the amnesty provisions of the Doha Document, the prisoners should have been released within 30 days of the signing of the Document by LJM. However, the Government rejected the initial list of prisoners submitted by LJM, on the basis that it contained, in addition to the names of detained LJM fighters, the names of persons belonging to non-signatory movements. LJM subsequently submitted a revised list that is under consideration by the Government.

12. The dissemination of information about the Doha Document by the signatory parties and civil society groups commenced in mid-October. UNAMID transported 25,000 copies of the Document, printed by the parties, from Khartoum to Nyala, El Fasher, El Geneina, Zalingei and El Daein for distribution throughout the three States. UNAMID continues to provide technical support and advice on dissemination to the parties and civil society groups through meetings and workshops.

13. On 19 and 20 October, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim hosted a fourth retreat for Special Envoys in El Geneina, Western Darfur, to promote a shared understanding among members of the international community of the situation in Darfur and the way ahead. Representatives of the African Union Commission, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America attended the retreat. In the outcome statement, dated 19 October, participants, inter alia, welcomed the signing of the Doha Document as an important step towards peace in Darfur, urged the signatory parties to remain committed to the timely and faithful implementation of its provisions, and reiterated their call for the non-signatory parties to pursue a negotiated solution to the Darfur conflict. They also agreed to focus on three key issues: support for the implementation of the Doha Document; sustained engagement with the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements; and support in principle for internal dialogue among the people of Darfur.

Negotiations towards a more inclusive Doha Document

14. During the reporting period, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim continued to engage the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi and SLA-Abdul Wahid, regarding the resumption of negotiations. The Government has expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations with the movements only after they have renounced their call for regime change "by all possible means", and only on the sections of the Doha Document related to political appointments and security arrangements. JEM has expressed its willingness to resume negotiations with the Government provided that all aspects of the Document are open for discussion. In this connection, JEM has produced a "counter-draft" of the Document, containing significant amendments to each of its seven chapters. For its part, SLA-Minni Minawi has rejected the use of the Document as the basis for negotiations and expressed its wish to negotiate national political and economic reforms. SLA-Abdul Wahid has reflected a similar position.

15. On 2 November, the former deputy chair and lead negotiator for JEM, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdeen, held a press conference in Doha, publicly declaring that he and other former JEM members had formed a breakaway faction. Bahr expressed his readiness to enter into talks with the Government using the Doha Document as the basis for negotiations. After initially rejecting Bahr's proposal, Government officials advised the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim that they were considering holding informal talks with the group. As at 19 December, the talks had not yet begun.

16. On 11 November, JEM-Khalil Ibrahim joined the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, established on 7 August by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, SLA-Minni Minawi and SLA-Abdul Wahid. A joint political declaration identified the alliance's objectives as, inter alia, the overthrow of the ruling National Congress Party-led Government by all possible means; the unification and strengthening of Sudanese political forces, including opposition parties, civil society, youth and professional sectors; and the establishment of a six-year transitional Government.

17. Senior JEM-Khalil Ibrahim personnel confirmed to UNAMID on 25 December that the movement's leader had been killed in an attack. While the circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear, reports indicate that he was killed in a military engagement while moving from Northern Darfur to Northern Kordofan.

Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process

18. In resolution 2003 (2011), the Security Council outlined the conditions necessary for a credible Darfur-based political process, including respect for the civil and political rights of participants, so that they can exercise their views without fear of retribution; freedom of speech and assembly, to permit open consultations; the freedom of movement of participants and UNAMID; proportional participation among Darfuris; freedom from harassment, arbitrary arrest and intimidation; and freedom from interference by the Government or the armed movements. The Council requested me, in that resolution, to provide assessments of those conditions to enable it, taking into account the views of the African Union, to determine further UNAMID engagement in support of the Darfur-based political process.

19. In providing an assessment of the conditions, it is noted that the number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID increased from 32 in the previous reporting period to 45 in the present reporting period. The overall number of documented human rights violations increased from 77 cases involving 142 victims from 1 June to 30 September to 116 cases involving 273 victims from 1 October to 14 December. This surge was due mainly to an increase in the number of violations of the right to physical integrity (through incidents of violence or harassment). There were no recorded violations of the rights to freedom of speech and assembly. Nevertheless, these statistics indicate that, overall, the enabling environment for a Darfur-based political process has remained largely unchanged.

20. In the light of the above, and with a view to informing discussions within and between the African Union and the United Nations on the form that the Darfur-based political process should take, UNAMID has begun to assess the views of Darfuri stakeholders on the role of internal dialogue in the peace process. UNAMID and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel will take these views into account when developing a revised plan for internal dialogue.

21. In accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2003 (2011), the United Nations is consulting the African Union and partners on a road map that would provide a framework for United Nations and African Union support for the peace process. The road map is premised on support for the implementation of the Doha Document, engagement with the Government and non-signatory parties to promote negotiations, support for a Darfur-based internal dialogue, and the coordination of international engagement in the peace process. I intend to submit the road map to the Council under separate cover once consultations between the United Nations and the African Union have been finalized.

III. Security situation

22. During the reporting period, incidents of fighting remained relatively few. However, the security situation for internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups, as well as for humanitarian and United Nations personnel, remained of concern.

23. In West Jebel Marra, a group of unidentified armed men, suspected by Government and local interlocutors to be members of SLA-Abdul Wahid, attacked the locality Commissioner's residence in Nertiti (63 km east of Zalingei) on 5 October. Reports indicate that Government police guarding the compound

successfully repelled the attack. There were no reported casualties. On 12 October, an unidentified armed group attacked a Sudanese Armed Forces observation post in Nertiti. No casualties were reported. Government and local interlocutors informed UNAMID that they suspected the perpetrators were from SLA-Abdul Wahid. The mission increased patrolling in and around Nertiti and nearby camps for internally displaced persons in response to the security situation.

24. UNAMID confirmed that in eastern Darfur, a Sudanese Armed Forces base had been attacked near Karoya Laban village (200 km south-east of El Fasher) on 6 October. Government authorities and local interlocutors informed the mission that they suspected that the attackers were from SLA-Minni Minawi. Reportedly, three Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and nine injured in the attack. On 9 October, an armed group, suspected by internally displaced persons to be Popular Defence Forces elements, attacked and looted Karoya Laban. Reports indicate that the attack resulted in the deaths of 4 people and the displacement of 1,240 to Neem camp (90 km south of Karoya Laban). UNAMID increased patrolling in the area and assisted humanitarian agencies with the delivery of aid to the displaced. On 13 December, according to the Government, SLA-Minni Minawi attacked Sudanese Armed Forces elements escorting a commercial convoy at Tangarara (40 km south of El Fasher). A civilian driver was reportedly killed during the attack. The incident occurred amid reports of a build-up of Sudanese Armed Forces and armed movements in and around Shangil Tobaya.

25. On 23 October, 17 armed men belonging to the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement, a small breakaway faction of JEM, sought protection at the UNAMID team site in Malha (Northern Darfur), surrendered their weapons and expressed their interest in joining the Doha Document. UNAMID facilitated discussions between the group and LJM on the possibility of its joining the peace process. On 16 November, dissatisfied with the lack of support being offered by LJM in return for joining the peace process, the members of the group voluntarily returned, under UNAMID escort, to their homes in Mado (55 km south of Malha).

26. The security situation in Zam Zam camp (Northern Darfur) deteriorated during the reporting period. As reported in paragraph 33 below, on 10 October a UNAMID night patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men aboard two machine-gun-mounted vehicles on the outskirts of the camp. On 29 November, following an altercation between camp residents and Government Central Reserve Police personnel, Central Reserve Police officers fired on residents, killing one and injuring two. Government police informed UNAMID that the Wali of Northern Darfur had then convened an emergency meeting, on 30 November, to address Central Reserve Police misconduct.

27. On 1 December, a UNAMID assessment team aborted a patrol in the camp after it had been confronted by an angry crowd that had complained about the lack of security. On 3 and 4 December, UNAMID patrols were prevented from entering the camp by the Sudanese Armed Forces on the grounds that the patrols did not have authorization. UNAMID met with Government authorities and camp leaders to address the restrictions and ease tensions. Access to the camp subsequently improved. The Mission then confirmed that, on 7 December, a Central Reserve Police soldier had shot and injured an internally displaced person in the camp who had intervened to prevent the soldier from harassing a group women.

28. No large-scale intercommunal clashes were recorded by UNAMID during the reporting period. However, with the end of the cultivation season and the disruption of pastoralist migration, tension between farming communities and nomadic pastoralists increased. Groups of Rizeigat, Habbaniyah and Fallata nomads, who would normally proceed into South Sudan along seasonal migration routes, have settled north of the State of Southern Darfur (South Sudan) border. They are reportedly unwilling to move further south until an agreement has been reached between Khartoum and Juba that will ensure their safety. This has contributed to competition between the nomads and nearby farming communities over scarce water and grazing pastures.

29. Also in Southern Darfur, farmers and pastoralists in Arad (100 km south of Nyala) clashed on 28 November following a dispute over alleged crop destruction. A farmer was killed and a Government police officer was injured. Government police arrested four people in connection with the incident.

30. On 21 November, in Western Darfur, following the receipt of complaints about pastoralists' animals grazing on farmers' crops in Tarabeba (85 km south-west of El Geneina), Government police confiscated several camels. The police were subsequently ambushed by unidentified armed men suspected to be associates of the camel owners; one police officer was killed. Government police arrested five suspects in connection with the ambush.

31. In response to the tension between farmers and pastoralists, UNAMID increased its engagement with the native administration and local government authorities in the affected areas and provided support for reconciliation mechanisms. In this connection, the Operation conducted two workshops on conflict resolution for more than 200 participants in rural areas near Zalingei, Western Darfur, on 27 and 28 November. Additional workshops are scheduled to be held in Nertiti, Rokiro, Mukjar and Bindisi in Western Darfur late in December.

Restrictions on movement

32. Between 1 October and 12 December, UNAMID carried out 19,644 military and police patrols, during which the Operation's movements by land were restricted on 31 occasions (compared with 35 in the previous reporting period). With regard to air movements, of the 4,810 flights carried out by UNAMID during the same period, Government officials refused 190 flight clearance requests (up from 131 in the previous reporting period). On the vast majority of occasions, flights and patrols were restricted by Government authorities while attempting to enter areas of ongoing military activity, including Kabkabiya (Northern Darfur), Kulbus (Western Darfur) and Shaeria (Southern Darfur). UNAMID continued to call on Government authorities to allow it unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur.

Security and safety

33. UNAMID was attacked twice during the reporting period. On 10 October, a UNAMID night patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men aboard two machine-gun-mounted vehicles on the outskirts of Zam Zam camp. During the ensuing exchange of fire, three peacekeepers (two military and one police) were killed and five injured (four military and one police). One of the attackers was killed in the exchange.

34. On 6 November, a peacekeeper was shot dead when a UNAMID patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men 5 km south of the Nyala supercamp. Two other peacekeepers sustained serious injuries during the attack. The incidents bring the total number of UNAMID peacekeepers killed in hostilities in 2011 to eight, as compared to five in 2010.

35. On 8 October, a UNAMID minibus was carjacked by unidentified armed men 5 km south of Nyala. No one was injured in the incident. Two days later, the UNAMID national staff member who had been driving the van was arrested in Nyala by the National Intelligence and Security Service on suspicion of colluding with the perpetrators. He was released without charge on 21 November.

36. On 5 November, an armed man broke into the International Organization for Migration compound in Nyala and robbed the occupants at gunpoint. No one was injured during the incident.

37. The international aid worker kidnapped in Nyala on 14 August was released on 16 December. According to media reports, six people were arrested by Government police in connection with the kidnapping.

38. In each such incident, UNAMID conducted an investigation to identify shortfalls and additional mitigating measures that could be employed. Furthermore, the Operation called on Government authorities at all levels to cooperate fully with it in order to help identify the perpetrators and hold them accountable.

IV. Humanitarian situation

39. The trend of internally displaced persons and refugees voluntarily returning to their places of origin in Darfur continued during the reporting period. Humanitarian agencies, working in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan through the Joint Verification Mechanism, conducted assessment and verification missions to several return sites in all three Darfur States. Humanitarian agencies confirmed the voluntary return of 9,312 internally displaced persons and 15,993 refugees to various locations in Darfur in October. This brings the total number of verified voluntary returnees since the beginning of 2011 to 85,172, including 55,872 internally displaced persons and 29,300 refugees. Most of the returns were to rural areas in Wadi Salih, Garsila, Bindisi and Habillah in Western Darfur, where the security situation has improved as a result of the rapprochement between Chad and the Sudan.

40. A joint assessment mission conducted by the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations country team and UNAMID confirmed that 269 households (1,240 people) had been displaced from Osban Doma and Karoya Laban villages to Neem camp (Southern Darfur) following attacks on the villages on 6 October. Humanitarian agencies distributed non-food items to the new arrivals, while the World Food Programme (WFP) is awaiting the approval of the Humanitarian Aid Commission for the delivery of food assistance. The Commission and internally displaced persons have identified nearby land on which the displaced can resettle. A total of 361 households (1,512 people) were verified as newly displaced during the reporting period, bringing to at least 70,000 the total number of those displaced since the beginning of the year.

41. WFP, with the support of UNAMID, continued to undertake the verification of internally displaced persons throughout Darfur in order to determine the correct number of beneficiaries for the distribution of aid. A stalemate occurred in Kalma camp between WFP and leaders of the camp, who refused to allow the exercise to proceed. Food distribution in the camp was suspended by WFP pending the resolution of the issue through discussions with camp leaders. As at 15 December, the distribution of food remained suspended.

42. As at 8 December, outbreaks of diphtheria in El Taweisha and Al Lait localities and in Zam Zam camp (Northern Darfur) during the reporting period had resulted in a total of 4,893 recorded cases of the disease and 17 deaths. The State Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross took measures to contain the outbreaks, which included, inter alia, providing treatment, community health education and vaccinations. The health situation in Darfur was otherwise relatively stable.

43. Low and erratic rainfall during the reporting period resulted in low crop production, a scarcity of water and a lack of grazing pasture for livestock. This, combined with pest infestations and insecurity, resulted in a relatively poor agricultural season in the three Darfur States. Parts of Northern Darfur, including Mellit, Kuma, Malha, Kutum and El Fasher localities, were the worst affected. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in collaboration with the State Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources, conducted a rapid crop and livestock assessment from 12 to 29 October to determine the impact of the erratic rains on crop and livestock production. As a result, UNAMID and food security and livelihoods partners have developed contingency plans to address food insecurity and mitigate the potential for clashes between communities over natural resources.

44. With a view to improving food security in Darfur more generally, the State Ministries of Agriculture, FAO and partner organizations distributed agricultural assistance to a total of 289,121 families (139,980 households in Western Darfur, 75,831 households in Southern Darfur and 73,310 in Northern Darfur) during the summer season. In addition, approximately 853,000 animals were vaccinated and treated for various diseases.

45. During the reporting period, attempts by humanitarian organizations to gain access to West Jebel Marra, which is under the control of SLA-Abdul Wahid and is home to an estimated 300,000 vulnerable people, were denied such access by Government authorities on the basis of insecurity. Access to Zam Zam camp and the greater Jebel Marra, Shangil Tobaya and Um Barru areas was intermittently restricted by the Government. The areas in and around main town centres were freely accessible, and the remainder of Darfur was accessible with a UNAMID security escort.

46. The intermittent restrictions included those imposed by Government authorities on the delivery of essential medical supplies to health-care clinics in Dar el Salam (30 km east of Shangil Tobaya), Kaguro (50 km west of Tawilla), Muzbat (60 km north-east of Um Barru) and Shangil Tobaya, which caused clinics to operate without critical drugs. Similarly, restrictions were intermittently imposed on the delivery of fuel for water pump generators to Zam Zam and Shangil Tobaya camps, resulting in limited water supplies in those locations.

V. Rule of law, governance and human rights

47. The human rights situation in Darfur deteriorated during the reporting period. Incidents recorded by UNAMID involved mainly cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual and gender-based violence and violations of the right to physical integrity.

48. As noted in paragraph 19 above, the number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID increased from 32 in the previous reporting period to 45 in the present reporting period. In addition, the overall number of documented human rights violations increased from 77 cases involving 142 victims from 1 June to 30 September to 116 cases involving 273 victims from 1 October to 14 December.

49. On 7 November, two *umdas* (community leaders) detained by the National Intelligence and Security Service on 2 August 2009 in connection with a murder in Abu Shouk camp were released without charge following an intervention by the Northern Darfur Wali on the occasion of Eid al-Adha.

50. On 28 November, the El Fasher special court on Darfur crimes upheld the 21 October 2010 findings of the Nyala special court and sentenced to death 7 of 10 JEM elements accused of attacking a Government convoy in Sanyi Afundu (Southern Darfur) on 7 May 2010. The decision followed a hearing at the National Supreme Court in Khartoum, which, on 20 June 2011, had overturned the findings of the Nyala court and referred the case to the special court in El Fasher on the grounds that the accused had not been afforded an adequate opportunity to summon witnesses. The accused were found guilty by the El Fasher court of, inter alia, murder and waging war against the State. They have the right to appeal the decision. UNAMID monitored the trial and undertook advocacy with Government authorities on the rights of the accused to a fair trial.

51. During the reporting period, UNAMID continued to receive reports of sexual and gender-based violence. Thirty-seven incidents involving 53 victims were recorded during the reporting period, compared with 15 incidents involving 31 victims in the previous period. UNAMID monitored Government police investigations into the incidents. In this regard, Government police in El Geneina arrested two suspects on 10 October and 20 November, respectively. On 5 December, the Nyala general court sentenced to death two persons found guilty of involvement in the rape of six females (five minors and one adult) from Otash camp for internally displaced persons on 19 November 2010.

52. UNAMID continued to undertake capacity-building activities for local government authorities and civil society on human rights. Between 9 and 20 October, the Operation held workshops on basic prison duties for 55 prison staff at the Ardamata and Zalingei prisons. On 18 October, the mission, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), provided training on gender-related issues to 40 traditional community leaders and, separately, to 50 Government police officers in El Geneina. On 24 November, the mission and the Southern Darfur State Committee on Gender-Based Violence jointly held a sexual and gender-based violence sensitization workshop in Nyala for 50 imams (religious leaders).

Child protection

53. On 16 October, JEM-Peace Wing submitted to UNAMID its second progress report on the implementation of its action plan. The report indicated that the movement had demobilized 49 former child soldiers and registered them with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for reintegration. SLA-Abdul Wahid informed UNAMID that the movement was drafting an action plan for implementation in areas under its control. UNAMID is assisting by providing technical advice. The mission continued to call on the Sudanese Armed Forces to extend the scope of its action plan so that it would also be applied to armed groups affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces.

VI. Protection of civilians

54. In order to strengthen the implementation of its strategy for the protection of civilians, UNAMID has begun to deploy civilian staff to team sites in rural areas. As part of the first phase of deployment, 17 civilian protection officers were moved to team sites in Kabkabiya, Shangil Tobaya, Kutum and Tawilla in Northern Darfur. An additional 24 staff with expertise in humanitarian affairs, the rule of law, civil affairs and human rights will be deployed in the coming weeks, so that a total of 41 civilian staff will eventually be deployed at 18 UNAMID team sites. The staff will, inter alia, monitor and report on civilian protection issues, provide expert assistance to military and police personnel and work closely with local authorities and humanitarian organizations.

55. In other protection-related activities, UNAMID police facilitated 49 security coordination meetings throughout Darfur. The meetings brought together Government officials and police, leaders representing the internally displaced, and community safety committee members to discuss local security issues. The meetings provided forums for strengthening relations between communities and Government police and for discussing ways to improve security in and around camps for the internally displaced. In addition, UNAMID facilitated the holding of nine camp safety committee meetings involving camp leaders, movement personnel and staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The meetings provided a forum for information-sharing on camp security issues.

VII. Deployment and operations of the mission

56. As at 13 December, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 4,489, of whom 1,104 were international staff, 2,907 were national staff and 478 were United Nations Volunteers. This represented 85 per cent of the approved strength of 5,285. The mission has continued to take steps to mitigate security risks and improve living conditions in order to improve the recruitment and retention of staff.

57. As at 13 December, the strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 17,906, representing 91.5 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555. This figure included 17,341 troops, 314 staff officers, 184 military observers and 67 liaison officers.

58. Also as at 13 December, the personnel strength of UNAMID police stood at 2,755 (81.7 per cent men and 18.3 per cent women), representing 73 per cent of the authorized strength of 3,772. A total of 16 of the authorized 19 formed police units were deployed. An additional unit (Nigeria) was scheduled to be deployed early in 2012. The total number of deployed formed police unit personnel stood at 2,229, or 84 per cent, of the authorized strength of 2,660.

59. Between 1 October and 13 December, the Government of the Sudan issued 766 new entry visas to UNAMID personnel. As at 13 December, 886 applications for visas were pending, 458 of which were for civilian police officers, 263 for civilian personnel and 165 for military staff officers and observers. UNAMID continued to urge Government officials to process outstanding visa requests, particularly for police officers, and to expedite the issuance of new visa applications.

60. As requested by the Security Council in resolution 2003 (2011), the Secretariat has commenced, in conjunction with the African Union Commission and the Operation, a review of UNAMID uniformed personnel. The review will involve, inter alia, an analysis of current and emerging challenges in Darfur as they relate to the UNAMID mandate. Thereafter, an evaluation of the mission's relevant concepts of operations, identifying requirements for change, will be conducted. The findings relating to the exercise will be finalized during the first quarter of 2012.

61. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted a total of 10,501 patrols, including 4,843 routine patrols, 2,085 logistics and administrative patrols, 1,478 night patrols, 1,076 short-range patrols, 621 long-range patrols and 398 humanitarian escorts. UNAMID police conducted a total of 9,143 patrols, including 4,719 inside camps for internally displaced persons, 2,611 in towns and villages, 1,531 medium-range patrols and 282 long-range patrols.

62. There has been some improvement in the readiness and self-sustainment capabilities of military and police contingents. Of the 54 units deployed to UNAMID, the number of units meeting the agreed memorandum of understanding requirements for deployment increased from 18 to 22. The Secretariat continues to work with troop-contributing countries on steps to be taken to ensure that the remaining units also meet the requirements set out in the memorandum of understanding.

63. During the reporting period, the construction of an additional team site was completed at Labado (Southern Darfur), bringing the total number of finished sites to 24, out of 35 under construction. As at 21 November, the construction of a total of 18 community policing centres had been completed, bringing the total number of operational policing centres to 49, out of a projected 69. The completion of construction work on the nine unfinished team sites and 51 additional community policing centres has been delayed by difficulties associated with the acquisition by UNAMID of land from local authorities and landowners, and the limited availability of resources in local markets. Further construction plans will be examined during the Operation's review of uniformed personnel.

64. Since my previous report, seven additional water boreholes have been drilled, bringing to 48 the total number of wells completed since the deployment of UNAMID. Of these, 35 are being shared with adjacent local communities. The remaining 13 will be shared once technical assessments to ascertain the yield of the holes have been completed.

65. The radio bridging solution, according to which UNAMID broadcasts its *Yala Nabni Darfur* ("Let's build Darfur") programme on Al Salam Radio for two hours daily, was extended by six months on 1 October. This remains an interim measure in place while the Government of the Sudan considers the Operation's request for an independent radio broadcast licence.

66. In response to a request by the Government dated 16 October that UNAMID vacate the terminal built by UNMIS at Khartoum airport, operations were moved on 28 October to the airport's domestic terminal. In addition, with effect from 31 October, the UNAMID Khartoum Liaison Office moved its staff and operations from the former UNMIS headquarters compound to new premises in Khartoum. These changes are not expected to adversely affect operations.

67. UNAMID has experienced extensive delays in obtaining clearances from Sudanese customs authorities for incoming freight, particularly shipments of furniture and air conditioning units. The number of containers in Port Sudan on which clearance is pending has gradually increased from 426, which arrived in a shipment on 6 May, to 447 as at 6 December. This is adversely affecting the mission's ability to complete the construction and equipping of offices, including those needed to accommodate civilian staff at team sites. UNAMID is urging Government officials, who are advising the Operation to purchase the equipment from local vendors, to expedite the clearance of the containers.

68. A total of 51 quick-impact projects were completed during the reporting period, with an additional 273 projects at various stages of completion. UNAMID approved eight proposals for quick-impact projects aimed at providing assistance to nomadic settlements in Northern and Southern Darfur. The projects will involve, inter alia, the construction of administrative offices, training for community leaders in civil administration and training in income-generation activities.

69. During the reporting period, UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. The Operation and its non-governmental organization partners assessed 119 km^2 of land and 716 km of road as free of unexploded ordnance, and located and destroyed 36 items of unexploded ordnance. In addition, the mission delivered unexploded ordnance risk awareness training to 14,503 civilians and training-of-trainers instruction to 25 teachers.

VIII. Progress against mission benchmarks

70. Pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2003 (2011), the present report includes an assessment of progress against the benchmarks set out in annex II to the report of the Secretary-General of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592).

71. Some progress was made towards the first benchmark, the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict. This included the return of Mr. Seisi to Sudan, his swearing-in as Chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, and consultations between LJM and local stakeholders on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. Moreover, the ceasefire arrangements under the Document commenced. Efforts by the signatory parties to strengthen support for the Document among Darfuri stakeholders through the dissemination of information represented an additional step forward. At the same time, overall implementation of the Document has been delayed, including the establishment of the Authority.

Disagreement between the Government and non-signatory movements over the scope of negotiations and the resultant failure to resume talks impeded progress towards a more inclusive peace process.

72. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, the overall number of security incidents in Darfur remained lower than average and was largely unchanged from the rainy season to the dry season. This was encouraging. Fighting between Government and movement forces was limited mainly to the West Jebel Marra (Western Darfur) and El Taweisha (Northern Darfur) areas. While there was an increase in tension between farmers and pastoralists owing to crop destruction, the number of intercommunal clashes remained low. The risk for the local population of banditry and criminality remained largely unchanged, as did the risk for peacekeepers and aid workers of an attack, kidnapping or carjacking.

73. Nevertheless, there was a deterioration in terms of the achievement of the third benchmark, namely, the enhancement of the rule of law, governance and the protection of human rights. There was an increase in the recorded overall number of human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. While UNAMID supported the improvement in access to justice in rural areas by transporting judges by air to Allait, Um Kadada and Kabkabiya to facilitate the holding of mobile court sessions, overall progress against this benchmark remained limited.

74. The fourth benchmark pertains to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance. The trend of internally displaced persons and refugees returning to their homes at a rate of approximately 7,000 per month continued. The number of newly displaced persons, while still regrettable, was low, at 1,512. Aside from the outbreaks of diphtheria, the health situation remained relatively stable. Humanitarian access to the vast majority of people in need was possible with a security escort. These developments represent progress against the benchmark. The poor and erratic seasonal rainfall, particularly in parts of Northern Darfur, and its adverse effect on food security limited further progress. At the same time, the situation in Zam Zam and Kalma camps remained volatile, and free and unfettered access for UNAMID and humanitarian actors has not seen significant improvement.

IX. Observations

75. Six months have passed since the Government and LJM signed the Agreement for the Adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. I continue to believe that the Document is a basis for peace in Darfur, and I congratulate the signatory parties on the steps that they have taken towards its commencement. While some progress related to appointments and the Ceasefire Commission has been made, it is imperative that concrete measures related to the needs of the people of Darfur be taken in order to build hope in the future. In this regard, I call on the signatory parties to establish the Darfur Regional Authority without delay, to commence the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement that are of importance to the people of Darfur, and to provide concrete peace dividends to those most in need.

76. If the Doha Document is to be a framework for lasting peace in Darfur, it must be embraced by the people, with a well-defined role for their participation in its

implementation, and must be inclusive of all armed movements. The Darfur-based political process provides an opportunity for grass-roots dialogue on the peace process and a role for the people in creating a peaceful future. I understand the sensitivity to the people of Darfur, the signatory parties and the wider international community in conducting the Darfur-based political process. If the process is to be credible, its participants must enjoy the freedoms necessary for them to speak and assemble openly. At the same time, the enabling conditions should not be so rigid that they prevent the start of the dialogue for peace. I support the work of UNAMID and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to consult the views of the people in this regard. The results of these consultations will be carefully considered by the Secretariat and the African Union Commission before further decisions are taken on the involvement of UNAMID in the Darfur-based political process.

77. I call on the non-signatory movements and the Government of the Sudan to listen to the voice of the people calling for peace and to recommit themselves to discussing all issues at the negotiating table without preconditions, in order to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict without delay.

78. My intent in putting forward a road map for the Darfur peace process is to consolidate the strengths of the United Nations and the African Union in working together to support the peace process in the wake of the signing of the Doha Document by the Government of the Sudan and LJM, which ended an intense phase of the joint mediation process. As noted above in the present report, the road map will be issued under separate cover following the finalization of consultations between the United Nations and the African Union. It provides a framework for the general direction that the two organizations can take in supporting the peace process in Darfur and, to that end, in working with the parties and the wider international community.

79. While some progress has been made in the overall peace process and the incidence of fighting in Darfur has remained relatively static, I remain concerned about conditions in Darfur as they affect the people, particularly with respect to human rights and humanitarian access. I call on the Government to take concrete steps towards ensuring that the human rights of the people of Darfur are protected. Such actions will have a significant impact on the creation of long-term peace and the establishment of conditions conducive to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

80. In this regard, UNAMID will continue to focus on increasing its capability to implement its mandate relating to the protection of civilians, and the United Nations humanitarian community will continue to support returns and early recovery as and where feasible. The Government must take the lead in ensuring security, protection and access to all areas for civilians and humanitarian workers.

81. I am deeply concerned about the security of humanitarian and UNAMID personnel operating in Darfur. I am relieved that the aid worker kidnapped in Nyala on 14 August was released, and I thank those involved in the release. Yet, incidents of kidnapping and attacks on peacekeepers continue to occur on a regular basis. UNAMID lost four of its personnel in hostilities during the reporting period, with 34 lost since the establishment of the mission on 1 January 2008, and 60 since the establishment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan. Unless there is judicial accountability for those found responsible for these acts, they will continue, setting back efforts to achieve peace. I call on the Government to work closely with

UNAMID in investigating violent acts against mission personnel and to bring those responsible to justice.

82. The delays in the issuance of visas for UNAMID personnel and the clearance by customs authorities of mission equipment at Port Sudan are of increasing concern. Such impediments limit the Operation's ability to implement its mandate fully and effectively. I call on the Government to process all outstanding visa requests without delay, to clear for onward transportation to Darfur the containers of equipment held in Port Sudan, and to allow the mission to operate unimpeded in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

83. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, and the women and men of UNAMID for their tireless efforts to implement the mission's mandate and facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the Darfur conflict. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude for the work of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, under the chairmanship of President Mbeki, the support for the peace process of the Government of Qatar, and the work of the many aid workers in Darfur who endure difficult circumstances in order to sustain and improve the lives of Darfuris affected by conflict.

United Nations S/2011/815

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2011

Original: English

Identical letters dated 30 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, and following my letter dated 23 December 2011 regarding the two terrorist attacks that happened in Damascus on Friday, 23 December 2011, I have the honour to attach herewith a list of the names of the 40 victims who lost their lives as a result of these attacks (see annex). In addition, the remaining 14 victims have not yet been identified. These terrorist attacks also caused the injury of more than 150 people.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-20121 (E) 050112 050112

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 30 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

1. Ammar Ahmad Al-Hussain
2. Ammar Ramiz Masud
3. Mahmud Muhammad Khalil
4. Jamal Abu Madi
5. Muhammad Walid Mahnaya
6. Da`a Farid Abu Mahmud
7. Raja' Farid Abu Mahmud
8. Izzat Al-Sheikh
9. Nazih Milham
10. Mahdi Mandu
11. Adnan Al-Hayyak
12. Mazin Ghanam
13. Ahmad Ali Musa
14. Ahmad Muhammad Uthman
15. Rafi Flayhan
16. Hazim Al-Salih
17. Ali Haurani
18. Eddi Al-Qantar
19. Ghaith Al-Jaghami
20. Mustafa Nahlawi
21. Muhammad Al-Sa`adi
22. Ibrahim Mahamid
23. Mahmud Sheikh Shuk
24. Ali Taha Salih
25. Qasa Yusuf
26. Ali Khalid Silu
27. Naim Mataniyus Murani
28. Nazih Ali Saqr
29. Taysir Muhammad Shahab
30. Hussamaddine Yusuf Rizq

31. Ali Mahmud Khayzaran
32. Ali Mustafa Nasr
33. Ghassan Hassan Sharara
34. Tahir Ahmad Zaynah
35. Hilal Muhammad Aynah
36. Hussam Ali Umran
37. Wajd Ali Marhaj
38. Yassir Adnan Shair
39. Ayman Abdulfatah Al-Alawi
40. Mayzar Haytham Al-Ali

United Nations S/2011/816

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 December 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 23 December 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter dated 9 December 2011 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, requesting the transmission of the communiqué dated 30 November 2011 of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the report on the efforts and activities of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

12-20071 (E) 120112

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 23 December 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 9 December 2011 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 300th and 301st meetings, held on 28 and 30 November 2011 respectively, reviewed the situation in the Sudan, on the basis of the report submitted by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan and the briefing provided by the Joint Special Representative for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Haile Menkerios.

The deliberations of the Peace and Security Council took place against the background of renewed efforts to finalize the negotiations on post-secession arrangements between the Sudan and South Sudan, address outstanding issues in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and promote a lasting solution to the situation in Darfur in a manner that addresses the interrelated issues of peace, justice and reconciliation in that region. In its communiqué, the Council addresses all these issues, providing guidance on how the African Union's efforts should best be pursued. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel will actively follow up on the relevant provisions of the communiqué. On my part, I recently visited Khartoum, where I had very useful discussions with President Omer Hassan al-Bashir.

Clearly, the international community can play a critical role in support of the ongoing efforts of the African Union and the overall quest for lasting peace, reconciliation and democracy in both the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in the attainment of the objective of two viable States at peace with one another and working together on issues of mutual interest. With this in mind, the Peace and Security Council has encouraged the Commission to take, as soon as possible, all necessary steps for the reactivation of the Sudan Consultative Forum, to facilitate closer coordination and more effective support to the ongoing efforts. In that respect, the African Union intends to initiate consultations with the United Nations to examine the possibility of convening the Forum as soon as possible.

I would be most grateful if you could circulate the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council and the report submitted to the Council as a document of the Security Council (see enclosures I and II). It would be very much appreciated, in the context of the close partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, if the position of the Union, as reflected in the communiqué, were duly taken into account by the Security Council when deliberating and deciding on the issues at hand.

Enclosure I

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 300th and 301st meetings, held on 28 and 30 November 2011 respectively, adopted the following decision on the situation in Darfur and the activities of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan.

The Council,

1. **Takes note** of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the activities of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan, as well as the briefings by Joint Special Representative for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim Ibrahim Gambari, former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan Haile Menkerios. The Council **also takes note** of the statements made by the representatives of the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan;

2. **Pays tribute** to the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and its members, former Presidents Thabo Mbeki, Abdulsalami Abubakar and Pierre Buyoya, as well as to the support team, for their commitment in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to the Panel, and **reiterates the full support of the African Union** for their efforts regarding peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur, the outstanding issues in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the negotiations on post-secession issues and democratization. The Council also **expresses its deep appreciation** to the Government of Ethiopia, particularly Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, for its commitment and sustained efforts towards the promotion of peace and the resolution of the post-secession issues, including the speedy deployment of troops within the framework of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA);

3. **Expresses its full support** to UNAMID and Mr. Gambari for the work being done in the implementation of the mission's mandate. The Council **also expresses gratitude** to the United Nations and to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Haile Menkerios, for their invaluable contribution to and cooperation with the African Union, and to all other partners contributing to the search for peace and providing support to the African Union's efforts, in particular Norway, the United States of America, the European Union and its member States and the World Bank, as well as the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who have provided relevant expertise;

4. **Reaffirms** the hybrid nature of UNAMID and its African character, as key to the success of the mission. The Council **recognizes** the contribution of UNAMID to stabilizing the situation in Darfur, protecting civilians, expanding the space for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, supporting the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, supporting early recovery and being proactive in support of the peace process. The Council **encourages** the mission and its leadership to persevere in their efforts;

5. **Expresses appreciation** for the steps taken so far by the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur of 14 July 2011, and **encourages them** to continue to work tirelessly and in a spirit of partnership to facilitate a final, peaceful and durable solution to the conflict;

6. **Expresses concern** over continued hostilities in parts of Darfur, **calls on** the armed movements that have not yet done so to join the peace process in Darfur and subscribe to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and **encourages** the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim to pursue and intensify the efforts being made in this respect;

7. **Takes note** of the intention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to develop a road map on the peace process for Darfur in close consultation with the African Union. In this respect, the Council **reiterates** the need to fully take into account the African Union position on Darfur, as articulated in its communiqué of 29 October 2009 endorsing the report of the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur and subsequent African Union decisions on Darfur;

8. **Reiterates its support** to the efforts being made by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, with the support of UNAMID, to facilitate the early launching of the Darfur political process, in line with all relevant African Union decisions, so as to comprehensively address the challenges of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. The Council **welcomes**, in this context, the commitment of the Government of the Sudan to create an enabling environment, and **requests** the Panel and UNAMID to intensify their efforts aimed at engaging all Darfurian stakeholders with a view to achieving a sustainable peace in the region. The Council **calls upon** African Union partners, in particular the Security Council and its members, and the international community at large, to fully support this Process and take the steps expected of them to facilitate the work of the Panel and UNAMID in this respect;

9. **Expresses appreciation** to the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan for the cooperation extended to the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, **welcomes** the progress made thus far in the post-secession negotiations, including the establishment, in December 2010, of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, which is the first inter-State mechanism between the Sudan and South Sudan, the agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area and the framework agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North on political partnership between the National Congress Party and SPLM-North and security arrangements in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, signed in Addis Ababa on 20 and 28 June 2011, respectively;

10. **Takes note** of the ongoing negotiations facilitated by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the outstanding issues, including: (i) access by the South to the oil pipelines that run through the North; (ii) transitional financial arrangements to cushion the economic shock to the Sudanese economy from the loss of revenue that accompanied the secession of the South; (iii) the division of assets and liabilities; (iv) arrears relating to oil and other outstanding matters; (v) banking and cross-border payments; (vi) trade relations; (vii) border demarcation, dispute resolution and the management of pastoralist migration across the common border; (viii) security matters, including the management of a demilitarized zone between

the two States; (ix) the management of water resources, including the Nile waters; (x) the nationality status of South Sudanese in Sudan and Sudanese in South Sudan; (xi) dispute resolution mechanisms; and (xii) the efforts to find a solution to the Abyei issue;

11. **Stresses** the primary responsibility of the leadership of the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring that the outstanding issues are swiftly resolved, in line with the overriding and agreed principle of two viable States, at peace with and mutually supportive of one another. Accordingly, the Council and Africa as a whole **expect** Presidents Omer Hassan Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir to demonstrate the required spirit of compromise and commitment to good neighbourliness, in order to speedily conclude negotiations on these interlinked issues, as the only way for the two countries to achieve their goals in terms of security, democracy and development, and meet the most basic needs of their peoples. In the meantime, the Council **strongly urges** that the leaderships of the Sudan and South Sudan desist from any unilateral action with a negative impact on the interests, stability and development of either country, and to put into practice confidence-building measures to enhance the spirit of cooperation;

12. **Reiterates the full support of the African Union** to the agreement on Abyei, and **urges** both the Sudan and South Sudan to faithfully and unconditionally implement their obligations under the agreement. The Council **commends** UNISFA for its tireless efforts in the discharge of its mandate, and **appeals** to the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations to continue to do their utmost to provide urgent assistance to the people of Abyei;

13. **Expresses serious concern** about the continuing conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and **urges** the Government of the Sudan to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected people of this region. The Council, recalling the framework agreement of 28 June 2011, **calls upon** the parties to immediately cease hostilities, permit unhindered humanitarian access and allow the return of displaced persons to their homes. The Council **reiterates** the call for both parties to immediately return to the negotiations in order to reach a peaceful settlement;

14. **Reiterates** the continued validity of the analysis contained in the report of the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur regarding the need for a holistic approach to the quest for peace, justice and reconciliation in the Sudan, taking into account the long-standing governance problems in the Sudan, especially the challenge of governing a diverse country in an equitable manner. In this respect, the Council **encourages** the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan to pursue and intensify its engagement with the Government of the Sudan and other stakeholders in order to promote and take forward this approach, including in the context of the ongoing constitutional review and reform process. The Council **also encourages** the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to work closely with the Government of South Sudan in support of its efforts to meet the challenge of governance in a context of diversity. The Council **further encourages** the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to continue to prioritize democratization in both the Sudan and South Sudan, as a sine qua non for stability and equitable governance, bearing in mind the diversity that characterizes both countries;

15. **Underlines** the critical role that the international community can play in the attainment of the objective of two viable States, including the immediate lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Sudan, the granting of debt relief and the provision of

timely and adequate financial support to lessen the impact on the Sudanese economy resulting from the loss of substantial revenue following the secession of South Sudan, and the provision of aid and technical assistance to the new State of South Sudan, as well as political support to the holistic approach to peace. In this respect, the Council **encourages** the Commission to take, as soon as possible, all necessary steps for the reactivation of the Sudan Consultative Forum, to facilitate closer coordination of efforts and more effective support to the attainment of the objective of two viable States, at peace with one another and working together on issues of mutual interest;

16. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

Enclosure II

Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the efforts and activities of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan

Introductory remarks

I hereby submit to the members of the Peace and Security Council the report of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan. As the Council will recall, at its 297th meeting, held on 20 October 2011, the mandate of the Panel was renewed for a further period of one year.

The report consists of two parts: the first, the body of the report, provides an overall assessment of the work of the Panel, including the progress made to promote peace, democracy and mutual viability in the Republic of the Sudan and the newly independent Republic of South Sudan. The second part, the annex to the report, consists of an activity report of the Panel covering the period since its last report to Council, which was submitted in November 2010.

Since its establishment, the Panel has worked tirelessly and has expended tremendous time and effort to address the Sudanese crisis. I would like to take this opportunity to once again reaffirm my continued support for the members of the Panel and their staff, and to commend them for their dedication and commitment.

I would like to urge the parties, namely the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan, to reaffirm their commitment to peace and prosperity by redoubling their efforts to conclude negotiations on the outstanding issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their post-secession relations. I also urge the Government of the Sudan to renew its efforts to bring lasting peace to Darfur and to the two areas. Finally, a stable future in both countries would require the respective Governments to address the many governance challenges facing them by promoting democracy, tolerance and the management of the rich diversity in both countries.

I. Introduction

1. Two years ago, when the Peace and Security Council established the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, it provided the Panel with a mandate that covered all aspects of Sudanese affairs. The Panel identified four priority activities, namely: (i) the implementation of the recommendations in the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur report; (ii) the democratization of the Sudan, including and especially through the conduct of the general elections; (iii) the completion of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and (iv) the negotiation of post-referendum arrangements between the Sudanese parties.

2. The Panel's view was, and remains, that each of these four activities is an essential and equal component for resolving the Sudanese conflicts and enabling the peoples of the Sudan and South Sudan to address their challenges of establishing democratic States that provide security and development.

II. Darfur

3. The Panel's position on Darfur, as presented to and adopted by this Council two years ago, concerned how the issues of peace, justice, reconciliation and Darfur's position in the Sudan could best be addressed. Noting that the conflict in Darfur was deep-rooted and complex, and drawing upon the evidence and opinions obtained from extensive consultations among all groups in Darfur, the Panel recommended that the issues be treated in a holistic manner by an inclusive process of negotiation that included all Darfur stakeholders, including the belligerents and the non-belligerents.

4. The Panel also recommended that the Darfur conflict be defined correctly as "the Sudanese conflict in Darfur", noting that it originated in long-standing problems of governance in the Sudan, and especially the challenge of governing a diverse country in an equitable manner. In its report, the Panel identified a legacy, inherited from the colonial period, that resulted in unequal access to power and resources across the Sudan. Since independence in 1956, successive Governments have not succeeded in overcoming this legacy, with the consequence that recurrent civil wars have occurred in different parts of the country, including in southern Sudan and Darfur. Resolving the Sudanese conflict in Darfur requires not only an inclusive and holistic settlement of those issues that have divided the people of Darfur, but, in addition, a resolution of the position of Darfur within the Sudan. In turn, that implies an inclusive national political settlement.

5. Earlier this year, in July, the Government of the Sudan and one of the Darfur opposition movements, the Liberation and Justice Movement, signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which was intended to end hostilities between signatories and lay the basis for peace. The Panel welcomes this agreement and presses the parties to it to implement it faithfully. It also calls on the opposition movements that have not signed the agreement to do so without delay.

6. The position of the Panel on Darfur remains unchanged. Its proposal to initiate a Darfur political process, primarily as a domestic exercise to involve all Darfurians in negotiating the future of Darfur within the Sudan, remains valid. However, in the light of the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which is currently being implemented, it believes that the immediate tasks are to popularize the Document, to ensure its acceptance by the population of Darfur as a whole and to persuade the remaining armed groups to sign the Document. Hopefully, these measures will bring peace to Darfur. In the new context that has emerged following the secession of South Sudan, the Darfur peace process will, of necessity, be linked to a national constitutional reform process that involves all citizens of the Republic of the Sudan in forging a new national political settlement. Indeed, a durable resolution of the Sudanese conflict in Darfur requires that a holistic agreement among Darfurians be an integral part of a national process. In turn, it will be evident that, arising from the Panel's analysis of the conflict in Darfur, such a national

political settlement will need to address the challenges of governance in conditions of diversity and the democratization of the Sudan as a whole.

III. Democratization

7. On the issue of democracy, the Panel considered that all Sudanese, whether united within a single country or in two separate nations, were not only entitled to democratic rights, but that democratic government was a sine qua non for stability and equitable governance, bearing in mind the diversity that characterizes Sudan, both north and south. It strongly felt that democratization should be considered a priority alongside the referendum on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan.

8. The Panel's concern with democratization remains. The fact that the people of southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly to establish a separate State was in part a reflection of a democratic deficit in the governance of a united Sudan. The separation of the South does not, in any way, reduce the imperative for democratic rule in both the Sudan and South Sudan.

9. On the eve of the referendum on self-determination in southern Sudan, in January 2011, the Panel addressed an audience of southern Sudanese in Juba, and stressed that the referendum constituted just one stage in the exercise in self-determination by the people of southern Sudan. It emphasized that self-determination also entailed establishing a system of government that reflected the rights and aspirations of all the people of southern Sudan.

10. For the governance of northern Sudan, democratization is no less important. The separation of the South does not lessen the governance challenges facing the Sudan: it remains a State that has failed to surmount a historical legacy of inequitable distribution of wealth and power and to meet the aspirations of all of its diverse citizens for a common sense of nationhood. Also on the eve of the referendum, the Panel addressed an audience in Khartoum, and emphasized that Sudan has a long and rich history as an African nation, characterized by diversity, and that in the event of the secession of southern Sudan, the northern part of Sudan would remain an African nation with an African heritage, faced with the challenge of establishing a democratic system of governance that would respect the diversity of the population. We stressed that, even with the separation of the south, the Sudan should define its future as an African country.

11. The Government of the Sudan has decided to conduct an inclusive constitutional review and reform process to address the issues of the democratization of the Republic of the Sudan and governance in conditions of diversity. The Panel has initiated consultations with the Government of the Sudan to see how it can support this process.

IV. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

12. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution that was derived from it have provided the essential framework for guiding the Sudan through the period from the signing of the Agreement, in January 2005, until 9 July 2011. The centrepiece of the Agreement was the referendum in southern

Sudan, which was successfully conducted, and its outcome accepted by the Government of the Sudan, in January this year. The Panel maintained contact with all the stakeholders involved in the southern Sudan referendum and intervened where necessary to help ensure the success of the referendum.

13. The referendum, its conduct and the respect for its outcome represent an outstanding success for the people of southern and northern Sudan, their Governments and the African continent. The Republic of South Sudan has been warmly received into the African community of nations, including the African Union. Membership comes with both the privileges that accrue to a sovereign nation and the responsibilities that follow to the citizens of the nation, neighbouring countries and the continent as a whole. The Panel is confident that, even as they justly and correctly value their independence, the South Sudanese have recognized the imperative of joining the African Union in their State's quest for economic and political integration of Africa.

14. While congratulating the people and Government of South Sudan, we also extend our sincere appreciation to the people and Government of the Republic of the Sudan for their extraordinarily gracious acceptance of the decision of the southern Sudanese to secede. For the Sudan, the separation of South Sudan carries very serious political and economic implications.

15. Other elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are also of great importance. Although the central provision of the Agreement, which provided for the special position of southern Sudan within a united Sudan, has lapsed with the sovereign independence of the Republic of South Sudan in July, substantial provisions of the Interim National Constitution remain in place, at least until such time as the Sudan and South Sudan adopt new constitutions. Inter alia, these provisions include federal systems of government with devolution of powers to states, respect for human rights and respect for the diversity of languages and cultures.

16. Moreover, there remains unfinished business arising from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, specifically with regard to: (i) the protocol on Abyei, (ii) the north-south border and (iii) the protocol on Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. The completion of these obligations is not only of importance for relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, but also for internal governance within the two countries.

17. The population of Abyei contains both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Arabs, and so as long as the area remains part of northern Sudan, the Sudan contains within its borders a population that is ethnically Dinka. Similarly, should Abyei be transferred to South Sudan, it will contain within its borders a population, both permanent and seasonal, that is ethnically Arab. Similar considerations will apply to the five disputed border areas, which contain diverse populations with ethnic and political ties both north and south of the border.

18. The Panel is working with all relevant parties to ensure the implementation of the June 2011 transitional agreement on Abyei, after which it will present proposals to the Presidents of the Sudan and South Sudan regarding the final status of Abyei.

19. In the case of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, the question of diversity is equally clear. Reflecting the special history and identity of the two areas, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provided for special arrangements for their

governance, and a provision for a process of popular consultations to ascertain whether the Agreement had indeed addressed the aspirations of the people.

20. The Panel has been particularly concerned with the situation in the two areas, including both its political and security dimensions. It exerted particular efforts to try to ensure that the parties found means of resolving their differences on these issues. During June 2011, the Panel facilitated meetings that resulted in a framework agreement between the Government of the Sudan/National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North that provided for political partnership and measures to resolve the problem of governance in Southern Kordofan State, end the fighting and provide security. Unfortunately, the parties have not followed up on the framework agreement. The Panel believes that the fundamental political challenges of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan have not changed and that they are organically linked to the issues of the governance of diversity and democratization, and that the parties will return to the negotiating table and reach a settlement. It notes that the framework agreement includes a commitment by the parties to initiate an inclusive national political process.

21. The Panel stands ready to facilitate continuing negotiations between the parties on the issue of the two areas. Reflecting a provision in the 28 June framework agreement, the Panel also stands ready to act as third party, both for the facilitation of political and security negotiations and to oversee the implementation of any agreement reached. With regard to the obligations to overseeing implementation, the Panel may call on the African Union and its member States to provide necessary support, whether of a financial, personnel or political nature, through the Peace and Security Council.

22. A recent development that will further complicate the situation is the establishment of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, which says it is "resolved to overthrow the NCP regime using all available means, above all, the convergence of civil political action and armed struggle". The Front is composed of three Darfur armed groups and SPLM-North, which is involved in the conflicts in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States.

V. Post-referendum arrangements

23. In June 2010, the Panel was requested by the parties to facilitate the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements. In those negotiations, the Sudanese parties converged on an overriding principle, namely that they "are committed to establishing and sustaining a constructive and peaceful relationship between northern and southern Sudan, which will promote the viability of both the south and the north". The Panel contends that a common commitment to "two viable States" is by necessity the only principle on which the Sudan and South Sudan can achieve their respective national goals.

24. There is a host of matters on which agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan is essential. Among these are the matters of: (i) access by South Sudan to the oil pipeline that runs through the Sudan; (ii) financial transitional arrangements to cushion the economic shock to the Sudanese economy from the loss of revenue that accompanied the secession of South Sudan; (iii) the division of assets and liabilities; (iv) trade relations; (v) border security; (vi) the management of pastoralist migration across the common border; (vii) the management of water resources, including the

Nile waters; and (viii) the residency status of South Sudanese in Sudan and Sudanese in South Sudan. The Panel is continuing to facilitate negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan on these issues.

25. The principle of "two viable States" applies also to the relations between the two countries and their respective aid donors and creditors. The financial viability of Sudan should be of concern not only to the Sudanese people, but also to neighbouring countries, including South Sudan, and to the international community. It is deeply unfortunate that, at the time when Sudan is suffering a severe economic shock, it is unable to rely on the institutions and mechanisms for international financial support that would normally be available to a country in such circumstances. As a matter of both principle and good practice, international financial restrictions imposed on the Sudan should be lifted without delay and expedited debt relief should be provided.

VI. Conclusion

26. As mandated by the Peace and Security Council, during the last two years the Panel has been actively engaged in all aspects of Sudanese political affairs. It has witnessed the establishment of a new African sovereign nation, the Republic of South Sudan. However, the objectives of the Panel, which are in turn the goals of the African Union and indeed the continent as a whole, have yet to be fulfilled. The Sudanese conflict in Darfur cannot be fully resolved until there is an inclusive political process addressing the issues in a holistic manner and until the issue of Darfur's position within the Sudan is addressed as part of a national constitutional process. The process of democratization, in the Sudan and South Sudan, has yet to be completed. Critical issues remain outstanding from the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, notably Abyei, the two areas of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and the border. Important issues on the agenda of the post-referendum negotiations remain to be resolved, in such a way that the parties can achieve their agreed goal of establishing two viable States.

27. We are encouraged that the President of the Sudan and the President of South Sudan have recently reiterated their joint determination never to return to war. However, we also note with concern the substantial list of issues that remain on the negotiating table, the ongoing active armed hostilities in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, the slow and difficult progress in implementing the 20 June agreement on interim arrangements for Abyei and the economic hardships affecting citizens in the Sudan and South Sudan.

28. There is no alternative but to reach agreement, in a comprehensive and expedited manner, on all of the outstanding issues. The alternative is not merely the continuation of the existing armed conflict in the two areas, but the escalation of conflict elsewhere in both countries and between the two countries. Such a conflict would make it impossible for either the Sudan or South Sudan to be governed in a manner that meets even the most basic requirements of their citizens for security, development and democratic representation. The neighbouring countries and the continent as a whole would surely be directly affected.

29. The Sudan and South Sudan have resolved to pursue their respective futures as two separate sovereign nations. In this context, the agreed overriding principle of establishing and sustaining a constructive and peaceful relationship between the

Sudan and South Sudan, which will promote the viability of both countries, is essential for each one. We urge the leaders of both nations to act in the spirit of this commitment.

30. Equally essential is for all to recognize that the Sudan and South Sudan are equally African nations, characterized by challenges of governance and development common to countries across our continent. Each must govern a diverse nation that has experienced recurrent conflict over more than half a century and each must undertake its own national process of democratization accordingly.

31. Lastly, although the challenges facing the Sudan and South Sudan are not unfamiliar, in important respects they are exceptional. There are few countries on this continent that have such bitter histories of division and conflict. Newly independent South Sudan has very modest institutions and extremely low human development indicators. The Sudan faces an extremely severe economic shock at a time when it is debarred from the sources of international financial assistance that would normally be available to cushion such adversity. The exceptional nature of these challenges, in turn, makes it incumbent upon the African continent, and international donors and creditors, to exert commensurate efforts to ensure that the two nations emerge from the current difficult period as full and valued members of the African community of nations and the international community as a whole.

Annex to the report on the activities undertaken by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan (November 2010-October 2011)

I. Introduction

1. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan was constituted in October 2009 by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its meeting in Abuja, held at the level of Heads of State and Government. It was mandated to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations of the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur and the completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as to promote democratization in the Sudan. Subsequently, in June 2010, the parties to the CPA (the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) mandated the Panel on the Sudan with the task of facilitating negotiations on post-referendum arrangements. On behalf of the African Union, the Panel has also sought to coordinate international engagement in the Sudan. Its mandate was renewed for a further year in October 2010. In October 2011, the mandate was once again renewed for another year.

II. Implementation of the recommendations on Darfur of the Panel

2. The African Union High-level Panel on Darfur was constituted in March 2009 and submitted its report in September of that year. The report was adopted by the Peace and Security Council, at its meeting in Abuja, on 29 October 2009. The Security Council took note of the report in December 2009.

1. Darfur political process

3. The Panel has continued to make efforts for the launching of the Darfur political process as complementary to the Darfur peace talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur armed movements. The Darfur political process is conceived as a process that allows Darfurians to reach consensus on core elements of a political settlement for Darfur, starting by uniting Darfurians on an agreement and then finalizing this agreement in negotiations with the Government of the Sudan. The Government of the Sudan expressed support for the Darfur political process and agreed with the Panel on the importance of an enabling environment — a setting conducive to an open, participatory and meaningful political process.

4. However, the Darfur political process has not yet been launched. For political and practical reasons, it has not proved feasible to launch the process as long as the Doha peace process was ongoing. The Panel repeatedly postponed the launch of the Darfur political process in order not to interfere with the Doha peace process, the completion of which was repeatedly delayed.

5. On 14 July 2011, the Panel's Chair attended the ceremony in Doha during which the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement adopted the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The Panel welcomed the Document as a possible basis for the subsequent Darfur political process, which could, in turn, secure broader support for any final outcome document. The Panel viewed the Document as a point of departure for the envisaged political process, not as a predetermined outcome that the Darfur political process would merely be expected to endorse.

6. Following the conclusion of the Doha process, a second factor delaying the launch of the Darfur political process became dominant: namely, the international disagreement about the meaning and role of the enabling environment. The Panel has always insisted on an enabling environment as a condition for a meaningful and credible Darfur political process. Other international actors, however, have insisted on an enabling environment as a precondition for the launch of the process, and have imbued it with demands not directly related to the process. These disagreements have prevented the Darfur political process from being launched.

2. Justice and reconciliation

7. In its report, the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur made detailed recommendations for a justice and reconciliation strategy for Darfur, within the context of the advancement of peace and reconciliation in that region. The Panel proposed the adoption of several measures for strengthening the national criminal justice system, including the judiciary; the establishment of a hybrid criminal court to address crimes in Darfur; and the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission. In line with the recommendations in its report, the Panel has continued to engage the Government and actors in the justice sector to promote unilateral action to strengthen the criminal justice system in the Sudan and in Darfur, in particular.

8. Progress in implementing the recommendations contained in the Panel report has been slow and uneven. The justice infrastructure in Darfur remains inadequately resourced. Uncertainty about the security situation in Darfur continues to hamper

the administration of justice in all respects. Police stations and formal institutions of justice also remain out of the reach of most ordinary Darfurians. Frequent changes in personnel in the office of the Special Prosecutor, including the resignation of two Special Prosecutors to date, have interrupted continuity.

9. Clearly, there is need to build greater public confidence in the courts in Darfur and to pursue more actively cases arising from violations committed at the height of the conflict. Furthermore, unilateral measures, particularly within the criminal justice system, remain essential and, in this regard, the office of the Prosecutor, as the key initiator of criminal justice process, has an important role to play.

III. Negotiating the outstanding issues in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement: 2011

10. The outstanding issues in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement consisted of the South Sudan referendum, the situation in Abyei, including that region's referendum, the elections in South Kordofan, which had been delayed from 2010, the popular consultations in the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, demarcation of the north-south border and security along the north-south border, in particular the future of the joint integrated units and the question of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the two areas.

1. Southern Sudan referendum

11. The Panel closely monitored preparations and conduct, in January 2011, of the referendum on self-determination in southern Sudan. In the light of the risks of postponement and derailment of the process altogether, the Panel engaged President Omer Al-Bashir and then First Vice-President Salva Kiir in a sustained and public shuttle diplomacy.

12. Recognizing the need for civic behaviour in the referendum campaign, the Panel prepared a code of conduct for the referendums and popular consultations to serve as a guide for all parties, organizations, individuals and groups in all aspects and phases of the referendum process. The code was subscribed to by all 21 political parties that participated in the all southern Sudan political parties conference, held in October 2010 in Juba, including the National Congress Party (NCP).

2. Completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the two areas: Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan

13. The Panel was concerned both with the need to complete the implementation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the two areas of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and also with the intrinsic shortcomings of the Agreement with respect to those areas, especially with regard to security arrangements. In that regard, the Panel followed the popular consultation process in Blue Nile State, monitored the state elections in Southern Kordofan and their aftermath, raising the issue of security arrangements for the SPLA forces originating from the two areas. Following the outbreak of conflict in Southern Kordofan, on 6 June 2011, the Panel took the lead in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict.

14. The process of popular consultation in Blue Nile began in September 2010, following the creation of the state government after the April 2010 elections. The

Panel was concerned that the popular consultation should be pursued not only in a technically proficient, free and fair manner, but also within a safe and stable political and security environment.

15. Two Panel missions to Blue Nile State, in December 2010 and February 2011, brought to light the fundamental grievances that endangered the exercise. The delayed establishment of the State Commission on Popular Consultation created complications in the Commission, which was unable to meet the 17 December deadline that should have marked the start of the citizen hearing process. Arising from this delay were apprehensions among some people in Blue Nile State that the process would be forestalled and paralysed in order to create a pretext to perpetuate the marginalization that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was intended to address. The SPLM leadership in the State repeatedly raised fears that the NCP was seeking to derail the popular consultation process. The Panel met with the leadership of the NCP and SPLM, with the aim of addressing complaints and ensuring that the popular consultation remained on track.

16. Because of a dispute over the voter registration process and the preceding population census, state-level elections were not held in Southern Kordofan at the time of the April 2010 general elections. Following a new census and electoral register, and the demarcation of new state legislature constituencies, the state elections were finally scheduled for early May 2011. The Panel was concerned that this date, occurring after the southern Sudanese had voted for secession but before the SPLM had formally split into two parties, one for each successor state, could pose dangers to the process. Consequently, the Panel followed closely the preparations for the election and other political developments in the State, and also initiated talks on future security arrangements for the two areas. The two gubernatorial candidates, Ahmed Haroun (NCP) and Abdel Aziz al Hilu (SPLM), had been close political partners during the previous three years. However, a meeting between the two in January 2011 failed to maintain the political partnership, and they then entered into a fiercely competitive election.

17. A delegation of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan travelled to Southern Kordofan to observe the voting process. It witnessed a process marked by a high and enthusiastic turnout and a peaceful atmosphere. Only minor complaints were raised by party officials. However, residents expressed fears that the outcome was likely to be both close and contested, and that the situation warranted close attention.

18. Panel staff made a final visit to Southern Kordofan at the end of May 2011, as a result of which the Panel raised the alarm over heightened prospects for conflict in Southern Kordofan. The Panel intervened directly with President Al-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha on this question.

3. Security negotiations for the two areas

19. The security cluster of the post-referendum arrangements negotiations met seven times, between July and December 2010, on a bilateral basis without external facilitators. The two cluster co-Chairs reached agreement on a host of issues, contained in a joint memorandum signed in December 2010 in the presence of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan. They set up architecture for north-south cooperation (the Joint Political and Security Mechanism) and agreed on the dissolution of the joint integrated units three months

following the anticipated vote for separation in the south. They did not discuss the issue of the SPLA forces from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, other than to include them in the schedule for dissolving the joint integrated units and to make an outline plan for the SPLA components of the units to be relocated to Kurmuk (Blue Nile) and Lake Abyad (Southern Kordofan/South Sudan border), respectively.

20. Consequently, at the time when the southern Sudanese voted for separation, the only agreements on the future status of the SPLA troops from the two areas were a single (disputed) provision in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the Joint Defence Board and the joint integrated units to continue until January 2012, with the provision that, in the event of separation, SPLA forces in the joint integrated units should return to their mother units and become part of the army of South Sudan, and a joint position paper that included the timings and locations for the redeployment southwards of those SPLA contingents.

21. Concerned about the neglect of the SPLA forces from the two areas, which numbered an estimated 30,000-40,000, Panel staff led a mission to the headquarters of the ninth and tenth divisions of the SPLA, in locations in southern Sudan adjacent to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, respectively, in February 2011. Remarkably, this was the first international visit to the tenth division headquarters, at Guffa, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and one of very few to the ninth division headquarters, at Lake Abyad.

22. The Panel scheduled a meeting with the Minister of Defence and the Minister of SPLA Affairs immediately thereafter, and put the issue of the SPLA troops from the two areas on the agenda. The meeting took place in Juba, in March 2011. The outcome included a decision to convene a special meeting of the security cluster, convened by the Panel, in Ethiopia, in the first week of April.

23. At the meeting, held from 3 to 6 April 2011, the Panel proposed the establishment of a joint command mechanism that would take over from the Joint Defence Board and the joint integrated units, enabling the SPLA forces in the two areas to remain in their home areas, with their distinct identities and command structure for a limited period, until they were integrated into the northern security apparatus, with the assistance of a third-party military advisory team. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA delegations came very close to agreement, but left Ethiopia without a signed agreement.

24. Armed conflict broke out in Southern Kordofan on 6 June, giving added urgency to the Panel's plans to convene a high-level meeting of the parties in Addis Ababa to discuss the two areas. On the margins of the special summit on Abyei, the Panel facilitated a meeting between Assistant President Nafie Ali Nafie and the Governor of Blue Nile, Malik Agar Eyre of the SPLM, on 13 June. Over the following two weeks, the Panel engaged in intensive mediation efforts aimed at bringing an end to the armed conflict and reaching agreement on a path to an overall political settlement of the dispute.

25. The Panel's initial agenda included facilitating a cessation of hostilities and a framework for the political resolution of the conflict, including a formula for the security arrangements for the two areas. However, neither side was ready to prioritize the cessation of hostilities, and the talks floundered on the issue of whether to recognize the de facto status quo (in which the SPLA had overrun more than 50 positions previously occupied by the SAF) or to insist on a return to the

military positions as they had existed prior to 5 June 2011. Both parties argued that the political framework was paramount and, if agreement could be reached on that, all other issues would follow. The Panel also travelled to Southern Kordofan to meet with Abdel Aziz al Hilu and his senior military and political leadership on 16 June. All issues were discussed.

26. Between 17 and 28 June, the Panel conducted intensive negotiations that resulted in the signing of the framework agreement on political partnership between the NCP and SPLM and arrangements for the political future and security of the two areas. The framework agreement for the two areas was a major achievement and a testament to the willingness of the leaders on both sides to make significant compromises in pursuit of a solution. Unfortunately, the agreement was not implemented. Subsequently, the armed conflict escalated significantly with the outbreak of fighting in Blue Nile, the dismissal of Malik Agar from his position as Governor of the State by the President and the banning of the SPLM-North.

27. The Panel still believes that the framework agreement represents a fair and workable way forward and that, if implemented, it would resolve the conflict. The Panel expects that, in due course, the parties will return to the framework agreement or to a similar formula for this issue.

4. Borders: demarcation, disputed areas and institutional rationalization

28. During the reporting period, the Panel maintained focus on the north-south border issue. It continued to follow up with the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the ad hoc technical committee for the demarcation of the north-south border, as well as with the borders negotiation cluster and the bilateral political committee.

29. The Panel acknowledged the deadlock within the ad hoc technical committee and called for a higher level of engagement to jumpstart the work of the committee in its meetings with the Presidents. The Panel also requested the African Union border programme to provide technical support to the parties. The border programme has undertaken three missions to the Sudan and has met with the ad hoc technical committee, the political committee and the Panel, in order to familiarize itself with technical issues.

30. During the month-long "super group" negotiations convened by the Panel in Addis Ababa in June 2011, the aim was to conclude an agreement on all border-related issues. These were: (a) the completion of the delimitation and demarcation of the border; (b) the settlement of disputed areas; and (c) the adoption of principles and institutions for managing a soft border between the two States, including the security arrangements along the common border.

31. The June negotiations managed to narrow the differences between the parties in a draft agreement on provisions on border issues, the last version of which was presented to the parties on 24 June 2011. This text is currently awaiting final approval and adoption by the two States. At issue now for the Panel is the format of future negotiations on this matter, given the pressing need for joint demarcation of the borders of Abyei and the clarification of the administrative boundaries in the disputed areas. Both these exercises are necessary in order to facilitate the security arrangements along the border area, including the deployment of the border

monitoring force protection to be provided by the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

5. Abyei and efforts to resolve the impasse

32. The Abyei question remains a crucial political and security issue that will have a significant impact on future relations between the Sudan and South Sudan. Following the failure of United States-brokered efforts to find a solution to the Abyei dispute in successive rounds of negotiations during September and October 2010, the issue was referred to the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan. Presidents Al-Bashir and Kiir insisted that the matter be addressed at their level.

33. With the failure to hold the Abyei area referendum in January 2011, a solution to the Abyei question became more elusive. On 1 May, a major security incident in Abyei set in motion a series of events, culminating in fighting between SAF and SPLA forces in the area and sparking a security, political and humanitarian crisis that consumed the attention of both leaderships and the international community for the next month and which necessitated the formulation of an interim solution to address the immediate security challenges.

34. Realizing the implications of the fighting on already fragile north-south relations, the Panel proposed a summit between the two Presidents, the Panel and the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, in Addis Ababa, on 12 and 13 June 2011. The summit resulted in an agreement that the SAF would withdraw their forces from Abyei, Ethiopian forces would deploy inside Abyei to provide for an interim security arrangement and a temporary administration would be established. This arrangement did not address, nor prejudge, a final resolution of the Abyei issue.

35. On 20 June, the negotiations produced the agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area, which called for the demilitarization of the Abyei Area and the deployment of a peacekeeping force, UNISFA, under a Chapter VII mandate. UNISFA began deploying immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1990 (2011) on 27 June 2011. The Government of Ethiopia provided the troops. The key mandate of the force is to establish the humanitarian conditions necessary to allow internally displaced persons to return. It is also expected to create the conditions that would allow for the political and security processes that had stalled to resume.

36. In order to operationalize the other mechanisms provided for in the temporary agreement on Abyei, the Panel convened the parties in Addis Ababa on 8 September 2011, where the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee was inaugurated. In addition to the two parties, the Committee includes a representative of the African Union and the commander of UNISFA as non-voting members.

37. The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee is tasked with: (i) supervising and promoting security and stability in the Abyei Area; (ii) exercising political and administrative oversight of the Executive Council of the Abyei Area Administration (AAA); (iii) determining and advising on the size of the Abyei Police Service; and (iv) supporting UNISFA in the discharge of its mandate, including the creation of the necessary safe conditions for the return of internally displaced persons and demining of the Area to guarantee their safe resettlement.

38. At its inaugural meeting, the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee adopted a number of working documents, including its terms of reference and the plan and timeline for the redeployment of forces of both sides out of Abyei. The parties committed themselves to commence the withdrawal of forces from Abyei on 11 September, starting with the withdrawal of SAF forces from Abyei town, and to complete the withdrawal of all forces by 30 September. It was agreed that the Committee would meet on a monthly basis and that its next meeting would be held in Abyei town on 15 September. At that meeting, progress in the redeployment of forces out of Abyei would be reviewed.

39. In calling for the immediate redeployment of all forces from Abyei, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan was mindful of the impact of the crisis on the livelihoods of both the internally displaced Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya pastoralists. The Panel stressed the importance of the withdrawal of all SAF and SPLA-North forces from Abyei as a matter of urgency, to enable the return of the internally displaced persons in time for the second planting season of the year, which starts in mid-September. The Panel also reminded the parties that the pastoralist migration season was also due to start shortly, and it was imperative that they withdraw their forces from the area to enable the migration of Misseriya pastoralists to continue with minimum disruptions.

40. Despite the signing of the redeployment plan and the establishment of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee on 8 September, at the time of finalizing this report there had been no redeployment of those forces remaining in Abyei, and the Committee had failed to meet. The Panel has been engaged in intensive discussions with the parties to try to get the Abyei process back on track.

6. Negotiating the post-referendum economic arrangements

41. The Panel's approach to the negotiations on economic arrangements has been based on the principles of the creation of two viable States and mutually beneficial economic cooperation, as agreed in the framework for resolving outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the future relations of North and South of 13 November 2010.

42. By December 2010, it became clear that the cluster negotiating on economics, finance and natural resources, which had set up five subclusters, looking at assets and liabilities, oil, currency, water and transport and communications, was having difficulty convening at all, and had made limited progress, including on technical issues. The Panel, therefore, opened discussions with the African Development Bank (AfDB) to provide African expertise on economic issues to assist the parties. This provision of experts was agreed in January 2011. At the same time, the technical facilitation provided by the Government of Norway to the oil subcluster was integrated more closely into the overall mediation by the Panel.

43. On 1 March, the Panel invited the parties, lead negotiators and core economic teams to a one-day exposure event, in Ethiopia. The experts provided by the AfDB and the Government of Norway made presentations on the overall economic context of two viable States, external debt, currency and the management of the oil sector. These presentations laid the groundwork for three days of intensive negotiations, which resulted in agreed minutes and substantial progress on a number of technical issues related to currency, oil and debt.

44. To follow up on this progress, the Panel convened a second round of talks in Ethiopia, from 9 to 11 April. Further progress was made on the debt issue and there was discussion on how to handle assets. The Panel invited an International Monetary Fund (IMF) specialist to provide additional expertise on the currency issue, which was proving controversial. However, there was progress with a bipartisan committee on trade and related payments, supported by an AfDB expert. The co-Chairs and Secretaries of the water and transport and communications subclusters were also invited, to address the impasses they appeared to have reached.

45. From 15 to 18 April, the Panel attended the World Bank/IMF spring meetings in Washington, D.C., to press for debt relief for the Sudan as part of international support for the concept of two viable States. The Panel briefed both the Sudan debt technical working group and the policy-level Sudan round table on the status of negotiations on post-referendum arrangements, including the steps required to support two viable States after July 2011. The Panel also met senior representatives of major creditors, including the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, China, Saudi Arabia, Denmark, the IMF and the World Bank, to discuss this issue.

46. The Panel reported back on these meetings to the parties at the third round of economic negotiations, held in Ethiopia from 19 to 21 May. Although the parties came close to agreement on a "zero option", by which the successor State of Sudan would retain all external assets and liabilities, progress on other issues was complicated by the deteriorating political atmosphere linked to developments in Abyei. The parties remained very far apart on the question of transitional financial arrangements, including the provision of transfers by South Sudan to ease the economic shock faced by the Sudan because of the loss of substantial revenues from oil following secession.

47. The Panel, therefore, decided that the economic issues had been matured as far as was possible in isolation. It invited the parties to fresh talks on the full range of post-referendum issues in Addis Ababa, which lasted for much of the month of June. During these meetings, negotiators agreed on a draft text on the issues of transport and communications and of assets and liabilities, which were passed on to the legal cluster for finalization. An agreement on water was also close to conclusion. However, substantial differences remained on the issues of transitional financial arrangements, oil and currency redemption. The parties, therefore, failed to agree on a full package before the independence of South Sudan forced a hiatus in the negotiations.

48. Following the independence of the Republic of South Sudan, and given the risk that there was now no basis for the continued flow of southern oil through the North, the Panel moved urgently to convene another meeting in Addis Ababa, in late July 2011, to discuss an interim arrangement to maintain the status quo. There was a wide gap between the parties on what would constitute appropriate monthly payments by South Sudan to the Sudan. Nevertheless, the Sudan did eventually announce that it would allow continued passage of southern oil through the pipeline, on credit, until the Panel could convene the next round of talks on a final agreement.

49. Since then, the Panel has engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy to bring the Parties' positions closer together prior to convening another round of negotiations. The principle of two viable States remains the foundation of these efforts.

7. Security: Joint Political and Security Mechanism

50. In December 2010, the security cluster of the post-referendum negotiations agreed in principle to the establishment of a Joint Political and Security Mechanism that would have overall responsibility for managing security along the common border between the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as any other security issues that might arise between the two States. The Mechanism is the first between the two States.

51. At the Panel-facilitated meeting of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of SPLA Affairs held in Juba in March, the two parties agreed that, upon independence of South Sudan on 9 July, the Mechanism should become operational, taking over from the Joint Defence Board and all other security mechanisms established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

52. The Panel convened negotiations on the management of security in the border zone, the Mechanism and related issues, in Ethiopia, in April 2011. A subsequent workshop on border security and third party role was held in Ethiopia, also in April, followed by a third meeting in Ethiopia, between 28 and 30 May. These meetings fleshed out elements of the operationalization of border security mechanisms, although many of the details, including the role of a potential third party, were left for future negotiations. At those meetings, agreement was also reached on the question of southerners employed by the SAF, according to which they were to be discharged, have their full end-of-service and pension entitlements paid and their files transferred to the Government of South Sudan for employment in the South Sudanese security services, as appropriate.

53. During the June 2011 negotiations in Addis Ababa, the Panel devoted much attention to finalizing the details of the Mechanism and what became known as the safe demilitarized border zone. Notably, it was agreed that UNISFA would provide force protection and logistical support for an international border monitoring mission. The parties signed an agreement on these issues on 29 June, with subsequent agreements on the details of the third party deployment following soon thereafter.

54. The first meeting of the Mechanism was held in Khartoum on 18 September 2011, convened jointly by the Minister of Defence of Sudan, Lieutenant-General Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein, and his South Sudanese counterpart, General John Kong Nyuon, Minister for Defence and Veteran's Affairs, and facilitated by the Panel. The Mechanism deliberated and agreed on the composition of committees that are established in the agreement on border monitoring support mission signed on 30 July 2011. They also agreed on the mission headquarters in Tharjak, South Sudan, and the 10 corridors across the border.

8. Soft borders

55. Guided by the underlying principles of the framework for resolving outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and future relations of North and South Sudan, developed in November 2010, the Panel developed a draft agreement on cross-border issues that reflects the commitments between the two parties to continue to enhance political, economic and social relations between them, while ensuring each other's security. The framework also requires that the border be a bridge, facilitating free movement, as

well as economic and social activity for the benefit of the nationals of the two States, whose livelihoods require them to move across the border regularly.

9. Citizenship, nationality and freedoms

56. Following the work on the framework agreement of November 2010, the Panel continued to engage the parties on the issue of citizenship and related matters. The Panel's primary objective was to assist the parties in ensuring that South Sudan's secession would not result in statelessness and to avoid other possible individual hardship.

57. After several meetings of the citizenship cluster, it appeared that both parties subscribed to the principle of avoiding statelessness as a result of the secession, but could not reach agreement on how this principle should be upheld. The Panel then engaged each party separately on their draft legislation, stressing that any new or amended law should be generous in granting or upholding nationality. The Nationality Act of the Republic of South Sudan, signed into law on 7 July 2011, grants South Sudanese nationality on the basis of any of a wide range of ties to South Sudan.

58. Committed to avoiding other personal hardship, the parties agreed that the Sudanese people, whether in the Sudan or South Sudan, should be able to continue residing, working and enjoying other freedoms in the territory in which they lived prior to South Sudan's independence. To that end, they agreed that the nationals of the other State will enjoy certain "freedoms", in particular the freedom to move in and out of the State, the freedom to own property, the freedom to conduct economic activities and the freedom to reside, which encompasses freedoms such as the enjoyment of social services. During the June 2011 round of the negotiations held in Addis Ababa, the parties committed themselves to reaching a specific agreement on these freedoms soon after South Sudan's independence. The Panel has offered its assistance in completing this important task.

59. The parties have agreed that people whose status is affected by the secession have at least nine months to reconcile their status. The Panel has discussed with the parties that, for this transitional period to be meaningful, each State should as soon as possible instruct their officials and conduct public information campaigns on how people can obtain the required documents. Access to documentation will also require technical cooperation between the two States, requiring the establishment of a bilateral mechanism composed of representatives of the relevant ministries.

10. Legal issues and international treaties

60. While several aspects of the substance of the Panel's work have legal elements, the negotiations presented specific legal requirements that the legal and treaties cluster was established to address. The legal cluster was responsible for dealing with the question of the treaties under which South Sudan would continue to have obligations and, more generally, with legal aspects of the negotiations, including the drafting of final agreements and the development of the legal and institutional modalities for implementing the agreements reached in the context of the negotiations.

61. At the request of the Panel, the cluster convened in June 2011 to participate in the "super" negotiations where, among other things, it provided advice to the

various clusters on questions of law and drafting. During the negotiations, the Panel led the legal and treaties cluster in a number of sessions to review the various draft agreements and consider proposals on structures for future cooperation between the two States. The discussions with the cluster found expression in the draft agreements that the Panel presented to the parties for consideration.

11. Promoting democratic governance

62. Pursuant to article 226 (9) and (10), the interim national constitution of the Republic of Sudan continues to govern the Sudan after the end of the interim period until a permanent constitution is adopted; only the provisions related to South Sudan are deemed to have been duly repealed. Various political parties and civil society organizations have shared ideas with the Panel for a new Sudanese constitution, but to date there is no clarity on how the process of drafting a new constitution will be organized.

63. In southern Sudan, the formation of the technical committee for the review of the interim constitution of South Sudan of 2005 drew the Panel's attention. On 28 April, President Buyoya held consultations in Juba with President Salva Kiir, Minister John Luk of the Ministry of Justice, leading members of the SPLM negotiating team on north-south issues, and members of civil society to explore solutions to the issues related to the development of the constitution.

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Letter dated 30 December 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations established pursuant to a decision of the Security Council contained in a statement by its President (S/PRST/2001/3) at its 4270th meeting. The report contains an account of the activities of the Working Group from 29 June to 31 December 2011.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Chair
Security Council Working Group
on Peacekeeping Operations

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Report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations was established pursuant to a decision of the Security Council contained in a statement by its President (S/PRST/2001/3) at its 4270th meeting. In the statement, the Council reiterated its agreement to hold consultations with troop-contributing countries in a timely manner at different stages of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

2. In fulfilment of its mandate, the Working Group held five meetings between the months of June and December 2011. The present report highlights the structure and substance of the meetings, including the exchange of views and recommendations of the Chair of the Working Group.

II. Meetings

A. Meeting held in June with delegations from troop-contributing countries

3. On 29 June, the Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations met with a cross section of troop-contributing countries.

4. At the meeting, the following thematic issues proposed by troop-contributing countries for inclusion in the July to December 2011 calendar of the Working Group were considered and agreed upon:

- Challenges faced by the United Nations in the procurement of helicopters for peacekeeping missions
- Enhancement of triangular cooperation between troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat and the Security Council
- Welfare and safety of troops
- Capacity gaps in the context of clear and achievable mandates

B. First substantive meeting

5. The Working Group held its first substantive meeting on 24 August 2011 with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat was represented by United Nations Military Adviser General Babacar Gaye, and the Director of Africa II Division in the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Raisedon Zenenga, who briefed delegates on the concept of inter-mission cooperation with lessons learned from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

6. The briefings focused on the historical rationale of inter-mission cooperation in West Africa, and its implementation in the United Nations Mission in Sierra

Leone in 1999, UNMIL in 2003 and UNOCI in 2004, 2006 and 2010. The successes achieved and the challenges faced by those missions during the implementation were also examined.

7. Specifically, the following issues were covered:

(a) How securing the consent of concerned troop-contributing countries, among other challenges, contributed to the delay in the redeployment of troops and assets from UNMIL for the implementation of inter-mission cooperation in Abidjan, and that the utility of the inter-mission cooperation mechanism was diminished by the fact that the security situation in Abidjan had stabilized somewhat at the time that the UNMIL unit had arrived;

(b) How the temporary transfer of troops and aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI in 2010 was carried out as part of the contingency planning for the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire;

(c) How armed helicopters were used to enhance inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL;

(d) Assessment of the success in the temporary redeployment of three Pakistani infantry companies to the western part of Côte d'Ivoire following the redeployment of UNOCI troops to Abidjan to protect the Golf Hotel;

(e) Utility of temporarily redeploying existing United Nations forces in situations of sudden crisis vis-à-vis standard force generation;

(f) Need to make provisions for inter-mission cooperation in the mandates of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

(g) Need for redeployments as part of inter-mission cooperation to include enabling forces such as engineers and logistics and transport units, and not to be limited to infantry, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft;

(h) Proposed revision of the standard operating procedure by the Office of Military Affairs, drawing on experiences from UNOCI and input from troop-contributing countries;

(i) How the potential areas for future inter-mission cooperation arrangements should include contingency planning ahead of the national elections in Liberia and the development of subregional strategies to address the threat of the cross-border movements of armed groups and illicit trafficking in drugs and persons.

8. The following were identified as some of the lessons learned from the UNMIL/UNOCI redeployment:

(a) The 2006 post-election crises in Côte d'Ivoire proved inter-mission cooperation to be of value but should be used only as a quick crisis-management tool and not as a substitute for the deployment of additional troops when required;

(b) Inter-mission cooperation should not be used to strengthen one mission at the expense of another at critical stages of mandate-implementation;

(c) Advance planning, coordination and communication with concerned stakeholders is critical to the success of inter-mission cooperation since it usually

takes time to obtain consent from concerned troop-contributing countries before effecting a redeployment;

(d) New approaches are required to tackle logistical issues. For example, the above-mentioned three Pakistani infantry companies were deployed from UNMIL to UNOCI under full sustainment arrangements, while UNOCI had no arrangements for the transferred companies; the United Nations will, therefore need to take steps to ensure that surge equipment, supplies and services such as tents, ablutions, catering services and medical access are readily accessible in order to provide the necessary support to uniformed personnel deploying under those conditions.

9. Finally, the Secretariat advised that inter-mission cooperation should not be limited only to the sharing of military police, personnel and assets. More formal and structured practices of information-sharing needed to be developed with a view to enabling the better understanding of regional dynamics and to fostering a more active approach to sharing experiences and lessons learned.

Exchange of views between the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

10. Delegations raised concerns about logistical challenges, which hampered the timely deployment of additional capacities.

11. Delegations also underscored the need to engage inter-mission cooperation arrangements in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Great Lakes region. The Secretariat, however, reasoned that in the light of mechanisms already in place, using inter-mission cooperation in the fight against LRA at the present stage would be counterproductive.

12. The need to involve troop-contributing countries/police-contributing countries in the planning and mandate-adjustment stages of missions was also stressed. Delegations recommended that periodic rehearsals be carried out to allow troops to familiarize themselves with the workings of inter-mission cooperation. To that end, the Secretariat reminded delegations of the Office of the Military Adviser's project entitled "Infantry Battalion 1", which would provide all battalions with standard skills sets and as such would facilitate the timely transfer of capacities between missions.

13. Concerns were also raised about a possible negative repercussion of inter-mission cooperation resulting from the gap occasioned in the redeploying location. The Secretariat was, therefore, encouraged to revise the 2007 standard operating procedure on inter-mission cooperation accordingly, bearing in mind the possibility of a void being capitalized upon by spoilers. It was suggested that a "sustained and informed" reserve force be provided to anticipate any trouble in the country of origin of troop deployment.

14. Delegations from troop-contributing countries also cautioned against the blanket use of inter-mission cooperation across missions, and requested a progressive approach recommending that troop-contributing countries and the host country be consulted and that sufficient logistical preparations be made ahead of a transfer of assets and personnel. While acknowledging the need for a progressive approach, the Secretariat stressed that lessons could only be drawn from experiences

and that the more inter-mission cooperation arrangements were implemented, the better the room for adjustments.

15. Delegations also highlighted a number of bottlenecks and legal constraints related to inter-mission cooperations, including the need to seek congressional authorization from countries contributing troops before such transfers took place. Accordingly, it was stated that inter-mission cooperations were not a panacea and should be used as a stop-gap measure as opposed to a substitute for filling capability gaps. Responding, the Secretariat acknowledged that the implementation of a number of inter-mission cooperation activities was constrained by several legal, managerial, budgetary, political and operational considerations. The Secretariat drew the attention of the Working Group to paragraph 77 of the 2005 report, which provided a number of useful recommendations in that regard.

16. The view of the Secretariat regarding inter-mission cooperations was also sought in the context of traditional operations, including hybrid missions. The Secretariat stated that it had considered the transfer of helicopters from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), but decided against the use of inter-mission cooperation at the time, given the risky situation in Darfur. It noted that discussions were being held regarding the possibility of employing inter-mission cooperation arrangements as part of the contingency planning for the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, it was noted that before opting for inter-mission cooperation, an analysis to evaluate the risks and opportunities was needed.

C. Second substantive meeting

17. The Working Group held its second substantive meeting on 2 November with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat, represented by Deputy Police Adviser, Shoaib Dastgir, briefed delegates on capacity gaps and capacity development of the host country's police force, with lessons learned from the support of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to the Haitian National Police.

18. At the briefing, a chronology was presented of events associated with the National police since 2004 and the thrust of MINUSTAH's support, including the reform process of the national police and the development of its four-year strategic plan.

19. The Secretariat stated that, before the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, MINUSTAH had implemented a "train-the-trainers" concept, establishing a police academy and developing a training curriculum that helped it to increase the strength of the national police from 2,500 to 9,000 officers, out of which 6,500 were vetted, recruited and certified. Visibility of the national police was also increased, which led to the restoration of public trust and confidence.

20. Despite the earthquake, which damaged 45 per cent of the police facilities, MINUSTAH relief operations ensured that 80 per cent of the national police resumed its tasks within two weeks. The police academy was re-established and provided special training for public order and forensics. Training was thereafter handed over to the national police, whose operations supported the safety of

internally displaced persons, as well as security, mentoring, anti-kidnapping and anti-sexual and gender-based violence units.

21. The gaps identified included oversight mechanisms, public trust and confidence, infrastructure, recruitment, training and the administration of the national police (finance, procurement, logistics and human resources procedures). The challenges to bridging the gaps were also identified, such as political buy-in, equipment deficits, budget constraints, gender imbalance and insufficient adherence to the principles of democratic policing, such as political neutrality and accountability to an independent oversight entity.

22. With regard to lessons learned, the Secretariat advocated the need to secure a consensus before developing a road map. In that regard, it stressed that the involvement of the local population, civil society and other stakeholders was crucial to the success of a road map.

23. The lessons associated with developing a strategic plan included an emphasis on gender during recruitment, a focus on the development of middle and senior management and the development of cross-cutting support mechanisms. The lessons learned also included placing priorities on building institutions by strengthening oversight mechanisms, planning and policy development. The Secretariat called for the host Government's coordinated approach in that regard and the establishment and maintenance of partnerships with stakeholders, including donors.

24. Finally, the Secretariat proposed a way forward that would require a concerted focus in the following areas:

- Political support for the five-year national police development plan (2012-2016)
- Developing indicators for the sustainability of the national police
- Incremental capacity development
- Institution-building
- Community orientation
- Transition of the national police to greater self-reliance and institutional sustainability, including in terms of learning and organization

Exchange of views between the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

25. Delegations acknowledged that United Nations policing continued to evolve. However, an inquiry was made as to how the lessons learned from Haiti could be applied across other United Nations missions. In that regard, it was suggested that a process be institutionalized for collating the experiences of experts from past missions when planning future missions.

26. The Secretariat stated that peacekeeping missions are context-specific and, as such, that lessons learned could not be applied generally, adding that one of the lessons learned was to refrain from prescriptions. The Secretariat observed, however, that trainings had been historically carried out to fill voids in capacities without any training dedicated to leadership development. The Secretariat equally noted that the capability of the United Nations police is directly linked to the level of expertise that Member States were willing to provide.

27. Bearing in mind that the Security Council noted the importance of the national police meeting specific benchmarks for reform, a progress report on how MINUSTAH has assisted the national police in attaining the benchmark was requested.

28. Delegations noted that the integrated nature of a peacekeeping operation may be affected by issues relating to political ownership, and they sought the Secretariat's opinion on how a mission's leadership could handle such issues.

29. Delegations also expressed concerns over transnational and organized crime in view of the drawdown of the MINUSTAH formed police unit capacity following its mandate renewal. They recommended that the United Nations police should also focus on training coastguards, a process for which some Member States were willing to provide the resources.

30. Troop-contributing countries underlined their concerns on gaps occasioned by a decline in public trust and confidence. Acknowledging that such gaps were largely determined by political factors, they recommended that more be done to engage the Haitian authorities in that regard.

31. With regard to providing police personnel with the requisite skills and specializations across missions, troop-contributing countries requested that the Secretariat provide its assessment on whether a force description would be required. The Secretariat stated that the first step was to have sufficient United Nations police specialists, adding that such a measure would require bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

32. Commenting on the reform benchmarks, the Secretariat stated that the United Nations police would, in the period of its second implementation plan, build substantially on the progress made during the first implementation plan. It was further stated that the effect of the drawdown on policing activities was negligible since the initial surge had been necessitated by the earthquake. While underscoring Haiti's large coastline, which makes it susceptible to transnational organized crime such as drug trafficking, the Secretariat noted that some boats had been donated by Member States but that not enough assistance was on ground to combat the menace.

33. The Secretariat noted that political ownership and coordination were required to usher in a sustained criminal justice system. While the national police needed to be professional, the host Government should be politically neutral, since a democratic police force can only be a product of a democratic government.

34. In view of the facts presented by the Secretariat regarding a foreseeable change in the role of the United Nations police in Haiti, Council members also asked if different capabilities were anticipated. Views were expressed on the need to build a consensus on the kind of structure required to develop the national police as well as the need to seek capabilities from countries with similar cultures to that of Haiti.

35. Troop-contributing countries observed that there was little or no cooperation between the national police and the United Nations police in the northern part of Haiti. They expressed concerns on how such a challenge could affect the sustainability of the national police post-MINUSTAH. Responding, the Secretariat stated that the concentration of the United Nations police in other areas, especially Port-au-Prince, was requested by the host Government and was a result of the higher rate of criminal activities and the higher population of people living in the area. It

was stated, however, that most of the police to be recruited would be deployed in the peripheral areas.

36. Speaking on behalf of Haiti, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations commended the United Nations for all the support it had given the country. He stressed the importance of deploying personnel who could communicate in the local language.

D. Meeting held in November with delegations from troop-contributing countries

37. On 30 November, the Chair of the Working Group held a second meeting with a cross section of troop-contributing countries. The purpose of the meeting was to elicit comments from troop-contributing countries on the agenda of the next substantive meeting of the Working Group. The perspectives of the troop-contributing countries would thus inform the briefing at the next Working Group meeting.

38. Troop-contributing countries raised the following points:

- That the Secretariat continues to give five to six days' advance notice of meetings with troop-contributing countries, despite the recommendations contained in document S/PRST/2001/3
- That technical assessment missions conducted in respect of UNMIL and MINUSTAH by the Secretariat were carried out without the troop-contributing countries being informed of the rationale for the assessment but merely notified on the findings
- That troop-contributing countries are not adequately involved during the planning stages of a mission, especially when a drawdown is anticipated; similarly, that the criteria used by the Secretariat to determine the retention of formed police units following a drawdown are not clear to troop-contributing countries

E. Third substantive meeting

39. On 12 December, the Working Group held its third and final substantive meeting for 2011 with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat was represented by the following members of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: the Team Leader of the West Africa Integrated Operational Team at the Office of Operations, Nannette Ahmed; the Chief of Police Selection and Recruitment Section, Police Division, Ata Yenigun; and the Chief of Staff with the Office of Military Affairs, General Jean Baillaud.

40. At the briefing, the triangular relationship was appraised between the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, as were the consultations with the troop-contributing countries in 2011. Using case studies from MONUSCO, UNOCI, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNMIL, MINUSTAH and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the relationship was also examined at the crucial stages in a mission's life cycle and during other developments in the field.

41. The Secretariat highlighted initiatives taken to strengthen the triangular relationship, including with regard to the timely issuance of reports and systematic consultations linked to assessment missions and mandate renewals.

42. While stating that the triangular partnership aims at improving oversight and enhancing awareness among key stakeholders, the Secretariat emphasized that the partnership encompassed a wider scope as it also involved the General Assembly and other stakeholders, including the Peacebuilding Commission. The partnership also extended to Member States in order to ensure that peacekeeping missions receive the necessary political, operational and material support needed to implement their mandates.

43. The Secretariat also elaborated on its renewed efforts, in line with the recommendations of the "new horizon" process, aimed at strengthening dialogue with troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The efforts include an increase in the briefings and information flow between the Office of Military Affairs, the Police Division and the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries when there are significant events or developments related to the missions, especially when there is a direct impact on the personnel deployed.

44. The Secretariat outlined the steps taken to enhance information-sharing and consultation, such as briefings on key developments provided to interested troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries every week by the Situation Centre, a factual weekly briefing note to the Security Council prepared by the Office of Operations, the Integrated Operational Team's informal consultations with Security Council members at the working level aimed at maintaining contact outside the usual briefing schedule and the briefings held before and after technical assessment missions.

45. The Secretariat noted, however, the need to enhance consultations ahead of assessment missions and to improve the analytical focus of reports of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

46. The Secretariat also pointed to the positive experiences with regard to inter-mission cooperation arrangements. Giving the example of UNMIL and UNOCI in 2011, the Secretariat recommended that inter-mission cooperation arrangements be explored further in the future.

47. Finally, the Secretariat underscored the increased need to take account of financial considerations during mandate discussions in order to avoid situations where peacekeeping mandates are received without the required financial resources to implement them.

Exchange of views between Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

48. Troop-contributing countries acknowledged that there had been an improvement in the triangular relationship, and in that regard welcomed the integrated nature of the briefings as presenting the opportunity to view, in a holistic manner, the challenges faced in mandate implementation.

49. While recognizing the relevance of information-sharing, the troop-contributing countries noted that resolution 1353 (2001) provided for more than information-sharing. It was underscored that triangular relationship could be given an additional

impetus by including systematic consultations with the troop-contributing countries before certain strategic decisions were taken. In that regard, the troop-contributing countries urged that their views be sought before an assessment mission is carried out, during strategic redeployments and at the start-up, transition and drawdown of a mission.

50. In line with the above, the troop-contributing countries requested that the timelines for the consultations at the various phases be enlarged to enable them to provide input at such meetings. They also stressed the need for such consultations to encompass the rationale for a proposed action, its potential impact in the field and the envisaged recommendations to the Council by the Secretariat.

51. Delegations also acknowledged that in order to effectively implement the spirit of resolution 1353 (2001), the line between form and substance must be blurred. In that connection, they called for improved mechanisms for addressing their highlighted concerns. It was also recommended that meetings with troop-contributing countries be structured in a less formal atmosphere than at present.

52. While inter-mission cooperation is regarded as useful, delegations drew attention to its potential for tactical complications in a complex, multi-mandated geographic situation such as the Sudan. In response, the Secretariat stated that decisions on whether or not to effect a drawdown of a military contingent were informed by a military capability study. The Secretariat also cautioned that it was often considered that sending signals of an envisaged drawdown could have adverse effects on the host country's political and security landscape.

III. Conclusion and recommendations

53. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, now in its tenth year, continues to derive its added value from the platform it provides for enhanced informal interactive dialogue among various stakeholders on generic and specific peacekeeping issues.

54. By maintaining a flexible programme of work throughout 2011, the agenda of the Working Group was enriched by the perspectives of Council members, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries as they arose. The Working Group also benefited immensely by considering the issues that attracted extensive discussion at the previous regular session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

55. The discussions of the Working Group can substantially enrich the debates of the Council during crucial phases of a mission's life cycle, including at the stages of mandate renewal, mission planning and technical assessment. In that regard, the Working Group should focus on case studies from peacekeeping missions whose authorizations will lapse in the months ahead and missions in which contemplated strategic actions would have considerable impact on a mandate.

56. The Working Group witnessed an improvement in the substantive participation at its meetings of the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, which also appreciably brought their experiences to bear on technical and operational issues. The Security Council could reciprocate such support by ensuring that the outcomes of the meetings are translated into timely actions. Regular

reporting on the activities of the Working Group to the Council will be a first step in the right direction in achieving this.

57. Given that the concerns of the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries are sometimes as diverse as their solutions to existing challenges, the Working Group should also become a consensus-building platform. It is therefore imperative to keep the format of the Working Group meetings informal and to further adapt it to a solutions-oriented platform.

58. The Working Group has continued to grow in strength and relevance. In order to sustain its unique role in United Nations peacekeeping, it is important to ensure that no gain is lost by consolidating the progress achieved so far. In that connection, the views and recommendations derived from the Working Group should be scrupulously explored and, where possible, implemented.

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 22 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations stating that Mr. Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, Mr. Nabeel Munir and Mr. Khalil-ur-Rahman Hashmi have been appointed alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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